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MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN* & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH**
ABSTRACT
Statutes of limitations, a long-standing bulwark of civil litigation,
mitigate the risk that evidence of meritorious claims will become
stale and relieve defendants who might be exposed to claims from
unending uncertainty about whether claims will be brought. But
these twin rationales are balanced against allowing plaintiffs
sufficient time to discover and file meritorious claims. This balance
is manifest in the judicial and congressional effort to fashion a
statute of limitations for securities fraud claims. The Supreme Court
in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds recently attempted to strike that balance
in its interpretation of the statute of limitations for securities fraud
claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. But we show that the
Court has failed. Merck presents a pleading trap for victims of
securities fraud that will preclude the adjudication of meritorious
claims. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s Merck decision exemplifies a much
more serious problem with the entire limitations regime for securi-
ties fraud. We demonstrate that the discovery provision in that
regime should be discarded for a singular statute of repose as the
discovery provision unnecessarily precludes meritorious claims
without providing any more support for the twin rationales beyond
what is already provided by a statute of repose alone. The repose
provision by itself reduces the use of stale evidence and litigation
uncertainty and it does not unnecessarily preclude meritorious
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claims. In this sense, our proposal bucks the trend of scholarship
addressing the statute of limitations that advocates eliminating
limitations periods entirely. We find that insights from behavioral
economics and practical realities of market activity justify some
measure of repose. Thus, we advocate abolishing the discovery pro-
vision in the statute of limitations but keeping the statute of repose. 
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INTRODUCTION
Statutes of limitations have been part of the architecture of civil
litigation for centuries.1 These limitations are designed to mitigate
the risk that evidence of meritorious claims will become stale and
to relieve potential defendants from unending uncertainty about
whether they will be brought into court.2 The “stale evidence”
rationale is rooted in the premise that resolving claims on their
merits is more likely if the evidence, including testimony based on
recall, is produced closer in time to the event that gives rise to the
claim.3 The “litigation uncertainty” rationale is based on two related
propositions: (1) a party who is uncertain about whether it will be
sued is more likely to be distracted by the threat of litigation, and
thus less likely to devote resources to productive purposes; and (2)
at some point in time, it is simply unjust to subject a party to the
sword of Damocles—the lingering possibility that litigation could be
brought at any moment.4 These rationales are invariably balanced
1. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). Nevertheless, the current climate of
regulatory reform provides the opportunity for reevaluation. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”). 
2. THE QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 158 (Robert F. Blomquist ed., 2010) (quoting Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1119
(7th Cir. 1983)). 
3. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (“Most
statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed
claims.”); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-06 (2006) (“The ... statute of limitation
promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, [and] safeguards the
accuracy of ... judgments by requiring resolution ... while the record is fresh.”) (quoting
Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000)); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (“Statutes of limitation ... promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory
is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them.”). 
4. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002) (stating that all limitations
periods provide “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff ’s
opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities”) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528
U.S. 549, 555 (2000)); Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988);
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against allowing potential plaintiffs sufficient time to discover and
file meritorious claims. 
This delicate balance is manifest in the judicial and congressional
effort to fashion a statute of limitations for securities fraud claims.
The Supreme Court in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds recently attempted
to strike that balance in its interpretation of the statute of limita-
tions for securities fraud claims under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.5 The Court held in
Merck that the two-year statute of limitations for plaintiff-investors
begins, not when they actually discovered the fraud, but when they
discovered or should have discovered the facts constituting secu-
rities fraud, which includes scienter—the “mental state embracing
[an] intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”6 Merck is the latest
effort by the Court to fashion a limitations regime that serves both
rationales. In this Article, we show that the Court has failed.
Rather, Merck presents a trap for victims of securities fraud that
will preclude the adjudication of meritorious claims. Moreover,
Merck exemplifies a much more serious problem with the entire
limitations regime for securities fraud. 
Next, we argue that the discovery provision in the limitations
regime should be discarded in favor of a singular statute of repose.
The discovery provision unnecessarily precludes meritorious claims
without providing any support for the twin rationales beyond what
is already provided by the statute of repose alone. The repose pro-
vision by itself reduces both the use of stale evidence and litigation
uncertainty, and it does not unnecessarily preclude meritorious
claims. Our proposal bucks the trend of scholarship addressing the
statute of limitations, which advocates eliminating limitations
periods entirely. We find that insights from behavioral economics
and practical realities of market activity justify some measure of
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. at 139 (“They promote repose by giving security and stability
to human affairs.”).
5. 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1789-90 (2010); see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78nn (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (providing that
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private securities fraud actions “may be brought not later than
the earlier of (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5
years after such violation”). 
6. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194
n.12 (1976)). 
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repose. Thus, we advocate abolishing the discovery provision in the
statute of limitations entirely but keeping the statute of repose. 
Part I.A of this Article provides a brief overview of statutes of
limitations and repose, as well as their purposes. Part I.B next
provides the necessary background to understand the Supreme
Court’s Merck decision by discussing the initial statute of limita-
tions for Rule 10b-5 actions that the Supreme Court adopted in
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson and its
common law evolution, including the federal appellate courts’
interpretations of what constitutes “discovery” and “facts constitut-
ing the violation.”7 Part I.C then discusses Congress’s statute of
limitations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and how the
federal appellate courts have interpreted it.8 
Part II examines Merck, including its factual and procedural
background, its two rulings of note, and Justice Scalia’s concurrence
advocating for an “actual discovery” standard, a seemingly pro-
plaintiff posture.9 Part II.C also observes that Merck will likely play
an increasingly important role in securities fraud litigation.
But, as Part III then argues, Merck’s discovery rule does more
harm than good. First, Merck’s incorporation of scienter allows de-
fendants to trigger discovery by invoking methods of imputing
knowledge.10 Second, the discovery standard may force plaintiffs to
concede that essential facts are not evidence of scienter or to allege
fraud by hindsight—setting plaintiffs up for ready dismissal.11 And
third, by incorporating scienter into the discovery inquiry, Merck
has failed to achieve uniformity in the statute of limitations because
the courts of appeals have different interpretations of what consti-
tutes an adequate allegation of scienter.12
7. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). See infra Part I.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s Lampf
decision and the lower federal appellate courts’ treatment of the statute of limitations). 
8. See infra Part I.C (describing SOX, its accompanying two-and-five-year structure, and
how the federal appellate courts further divided over its meaning). 
9. 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010); see infra Part II.A-B. 
10. See infra Part III.A.1. 
11. See infra Part III.A.2 (exploring the “pleading trap” Merck sets up for plaintiff-
investors). 
12. See infra Part III.A.3 (demonstrating that the circuits take varying approaches in
determining scienter).
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Recognizing that Merck is marred with pitfalls and pleading
traps, Part III next questions the usefulness of the discovery pro-
vision for the statute of limitations for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
actions and concludes it is unnecessary. The practical realities of
securities fraud claims already encourage diligence and prompt
filing.13 Moreover, discovery of meritorious securities fraud claims
is difficult and time-consuming.14 By abolishing the discovery pro-
vision, meritorious claims proceed and the costs associated with
litigating these colossal suits should also decrease.15 
Yet Part IV argues that, contrary to the scholastic trend toward
eschewing limitations periods entirely, some repose is still neces-
sary.16 Insights from behavioral economics, such as loss aversion,
justify a statute of repose for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Also,
without repose, securities fraud would affect settled economic
expectations of nonculpable market participants. Part IV then pro-
poses a statute of repose for securities fraud. This limitation period
must be a bright-line rule simple in application. And it must be long
enough to promote merits resolution and to prevent an end run
around the private right of action. Thus, Part IV concludes that
Congress should retain only its five-year statute of repose that is
triggered upon the happening of the fraud. 
   I. THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND THE STATUTE OF    
LIMITATIONS FOR PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD
In the United States, companies are traditionally characterized
by dispersed ownership, that is, “no single shareholder [or group]
owns sufficient shares to ensure its ability to elect directors,”
and, as a result, ownership is separated from control.17 Thus,
13. See infra Part III.B.1. 
14. See infra Part III.B.2 (showing that securities fraud is inherently secretive, complex,
and difficult to detect). 
15. See infra Part III.B.3 (observing that the statute of limitations, as a procedural cost
with no corresponding benefit, imposes unnecessary, additional costs on litigants). 
16. See infra Part IV. 
17. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
80, 82 (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed
Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111
YALE L.J. 1, 25-39 (2001); see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 129 (rev. ed., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968)
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shareholders in a dispersed ownership system depend on a com-
pany’s public disclosures for information because these sharehold-
ers have little, if any, direct access to management and cannot
easily monitor corporate affairs.18 Because shareholders depend on
corporate disclosures as their only source of information, it is all the
more important that these disclosures are accurate. Congress
concluded that one way to ensure the integrity of the nation’s
marketplace is to afford private rights of action to victims of
securities fraud.19 As the Supreme Court has long recognized, these
private rights of action supplement enforcement efforts by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to provide for holistic enforcement of federal securi-
ties laws.20
(1932); John H. Biggs, Shareholder Democracy: The Roots of Activism and the Selection of
Directors, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 493, 498 (2008) (“The Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (“PCAOB”) estimates that [55] percent of American families now own stock in public
companies, mostly through their [Defined Contribution] plans and IRAs. Another large
percentage own stocks through their state and municipal multi-employer plans where
contributions, taxes, and benefits are all determined, in great part, by the investment results
of the stocks held in public companies.”). Some consider the separation of ownership and
control the cause of the recent financial economic collapse; separating ownership from control
turned companies into objects of speculation and transferred financial risk and, ultimately,
responsibility, to shareholders. E.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 263-64 (2010) (“The
effect of turning a partnership into a corporation was to transfer the financial risk to the
shareholders.... When the Wall Street investment bank screwed up badly enough, its risks
became the problem of the United States government.”). 
18. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 17, at 82-83.
19. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (finding that securities regulation has
a dual aim of protecting investors and promoting growth of financial markets); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (stating
that the overriding purpose of the securities laws is to protect investors and maintain
confidence in the market so national savings and investments may grow for the benefit of
all). 
20. E.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007)
(recognizing that private actions are an “essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and
civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the
Securities and Exchange Commission”); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345
(2005) (finding that “the availability of private securities fraud actions” acts to deter fraud
and thereby helps maintain “public confidence in the [securities] marketplace”); Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (reaffirming that the private right of action “constitutes
an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s requirements”); Randall v. Loftsgaarden,
478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (noting “the deterrent value of private rights of action” under the
securities laws); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement ...
provides a necessary supplement to [SEC] action.”).
1556 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1547
Several significant securities laws have shaped private securities
fraud litigation. First, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) aimed
to provide investors with sufficient, material information regarding
securities that were offered for sale, and to prohibit deceit by the
offerees.21 Section 11 of the 1933 Act regulates the primary offering
of securities by granting a private right of action to stock purchas-
ers against those who make material misrepresentations or omis-
sions in the registration statement of an initial public offering.22
Section 12(a)(2) grants a private right of action against those who
offer or sell stock through a prospectus or oral communication that
contains a material omission or misstatement.23 The difference
between section 11 and section 12(a)(2) is that section 11 pertains
to material misstatements and omissions made in a registration
statement, while section 12(a)(2) pertains to material misstate-
ments or omissions made in a prospectus.24 In section 13 of the 1933
Act, Congress imposed a one-year statute of limitations triggered
21. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). Under the 1933 Act, purchasers
may sue “participants”—the issuer, signers of the registration statement, directors and
officers, underwriters, and other professionals—by merely showing that the registration
statement contained a material misrepresentation or omission. E.g., In re Constar Int’l Inc.
Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2009); APA Excelsior III LP v. Premiere Techs., Inc.,
476 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007); In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir.
2005). Scienter is not required for a section 11 claim. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 296 (1993). This heavy-handed form of liability is tempered by
the defendant’s affirmative defense of due diligence, see Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)-(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(b), in which defendants other than the issuer may avoid liability by proving
that, after a reasonable investigation, they had no grounds to believe that the parts of the
registration statement attributed to them contained material misstatements or omissions.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). A prospectus is “[a] printed
document that describes a [corporation’s business] and that is distributed to prospective
buyers or investors.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1342 (9th ed. 2009). A plaintiff need only
prove that the offeror or seller made a material misstatement or omission; an offeror or seller
is someone who successfully solicits the purchase of securities motivated at least by a desire
to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S.
622, 642-43 (1988). 
24. E.g., Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 519 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 161 (2008); Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005);
In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004); Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd.
v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2002); Gasner v. Bd. of Superintendents, 103 F.3d
351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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upon constructive discovery of the false statement and a three-year
statute of repose that starts on the date of the fraud for section 11
and section 12 claims.25 Section 13 triggers the statute of limita-
tions either “within one year after the discovery” of the false
statement “or after such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence.”26 The statute of limitations gov-
erning section 11 and section 12(a)(2) is triggered upon constructive
discovery because determining when a plaintiff should have
uncovered an untrue assertion in a registration statement or
prospectus is arguably a simple task.27
Congress also passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act) to regulate the secondary trading of securities.28 The primary
aim of the 1934 Act was “to protect investors against [the] manipu-
lation of stock prices.”29 The federal courts recognized that investors
had an implied private right of action under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, which prohibits fraudulent or deceptive conduct in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security, and the SEC’s
accompanying Rule 10b-5.30 Because this right of action was im-
plied, it did not contain a statute of limitations,31 but several other
provisions of the 1934 Act did, including section 9(e), section 16(b),
and section 18(a).32 These sections had a one-year statute of limi-
tations and a three-year statute of repose—the “one-and-three-year
structure.”33 It was unclear, however, whether this statute of
limitations applied to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions.34
25. Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
26. Id. (emphasis added). 
27. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1801 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
29. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
30. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). In 1946, for the first time, a court held
that investors could bring a private action for violations of Rule 10b-5. Kardon v. Nat’l
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). According to the Supreme Court, the
implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is now “simply beyond peradventure.”
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
31. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 (1991). 
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(c), 78cc(b). 
33. Id. 
34. See infra Part I.B.
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A. Statutes of Limitations, Repose, and Discovery-Accrual
Before discussing the statutes of limitations and repose for
securities fraud specifically, a general understanding of these two
procedural rules is necessary. “The statute of limitations is a com-
plete bar to actions that do not meet its time limits. It is in no way
dependent on the merits of the case.”35 The statute of limitations
creates an affirmative defense when a plaintiff fails to sue within
a specified time after the plaintiff discovers the cause of action,
although it is often subject to tolling principles.36 A statute of repose
“extinguishes a plaintiff’s cause of action after the passage of a
fixed period of time, usually measured from one of the defendant’s
acts.”37 In essence though, both provide “repose,”38 or a time limit
after which an action cannot be brought in court.39 Professor Tyler
T. Ochoa and Judge Andrew J. Wistrich have written the seminal
work that describes the purposes of statutes of limitations and
repose. Simply stated, Professor Ochoa and Judge Wistrich found
that these statues aim (1) to prevent the use of stale evidence, and
(2) to provide defendants with the comfort of knowing that they are
free from suit and to protect settled expectations.40 
Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, however, differ in
both length and accrual. Statutes of limitations are often shorter
and are usually triggered upon discovery of the claim (discovery-
35. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 617 (11th ed. 2005). 
36. See, e.g., Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d
Cir. 2010); Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 494 F.3d 956, 974 (11th Cir. 2007); Johnson
v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 782 n.13 (9th Cir. 2007). 
37. Ma, 597 F.3d at 88 n.4; see also Johnson, 490 F.3d at 781 n.12. 
38. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 230-31 (1953) (Reed, J., dissenting) (“Of
course, statutes of limitation are statutes of repose.”). 
39. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1546. 
40. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 458, 460 (1997). Professor Ochoa and Judge Wistrich catalogue
the following purposes of statutes of limitations: (1) to promote repose, which provides peace
of mind, avoids disrupting settled expectations, reduces uncertainty, and reduces protective
measures and associated costs; (2) to minimize the deterioration of evidence, and thereby
ensure accurate fact-finding, prevent fraud, reduce litigation costs, and protect the integrity
of the judicial system; (3) to place defendants and plaintiffs on equal footing; (4) to promote
cultural values of diligence; (5) to encourage the prompt enforcement of the substantive law;
(6) to avoid the retrospective application of contemporary standards; and (7) to reduce the
overall volume of litigation. Id. at 460-99.
2011] TOWARD A JUST MEASURE OF REPOSE 1559
accrual), whereas statutes of repose are often longer, capping the
time for liability, and are triggered by the complained of event
(event-accrual).41 As the Article illustrates, the statute of limita-
tions, with its discovery-based accrual, proves problematic in appli-
cation. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Limitations Period
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was enacted without a statute of
limitations or repose because the private right of action under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was judicially created. So, “faced with the
awkward task of discerning the limitations period that Congress
intended ... to apply to a cause of action it really never knew
existed,”42 courts implied the applicable period using one of four
alternatives: (1) the statute of limitations contained in section 13 of
the 1933 Act;43 (2) the forum state’s statute of limitations for
common law fraud; (3) the statute of limitations for securities fraud
under the forum state’s “blue-sky law”;44 or (4) the statute of limi-
tations contained in section 9(e), section 16(b), or section 18(a) of
the 1934 Act.45
For decades, courts borrowed the statute of limitations from the
closest analogous state-law cause of action.46 But “[d]eciding which
41. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2006) (imposing a limit of two years from discovery of the
violation, plus a statute of repose at five years for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (imposing a limit of three years from discovery of an ERISA violation,
plus a statute of repose at six years for breach of fiduciary duty); 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (imposing
a limit of three years from discovery of the violation, plus a statute of repose at six years for
violations of the False Claims Act); see also Wike v. Vertrue, Inc., 566 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir.
2009) (recognizing that statutes of limitations accrue on discovery and statutes of repose
accrue on the happening of the complained of event); Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1044,
1049 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 
42. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 (1991). 
43. The statute of limitations is expressly applicable to sections 11 and 12 of the 1933
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
44. A “blue-sky law” is a state statute that establishes “standards for offering and selling
securities, the purpose being to protect citizens from investing in fraudulent schemes or
unsuitable companies.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 196. 
45. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.16 (6th ed. 2009). 
46. See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818-19 (10th Cir.
1990) (per curiam); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1990); O’Hara v. Kovens,
625 F.2d 15, 17 (4th Cir. 1980); Forrestal Vill., Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir.
1977).
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features of state periods of limitations to adopt for which federal
statutes waste[d] untold hours.... There [were] many potentially
analogous state statutes, with variations for different kinds of
securities offenses and different circumstances that might toll the
period of limitations.”47 Recognizing the need to minimize the
uncertainty and time-consuming litigation inherent in that
approach, the Third Circuit in In re Data Access Systems was the
first to advocate and adopt a uniform limitations period for section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.48 In Data Access, the Third Circuit
determined that using the limitations periods in other sections of
the 1934 Act would lead to desired uniformity and certainty.49
Specifically, the Third Circuit adopted the one-and-three-year
structure that applied to sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18(a) of the 1934
Act.50
After Data Access, the stage was set for a uniform, national
statute of limitations. “Both the bar and scholars ... pleaded, with
a unanimity rare in the law, for help.... Only Congress or the
Supreme Court [could] bring uniformity and predictability to this
field.”51 And in 1991 the Supreme Court did just that, holding in
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson that the
one-and-three-year structure under section 9(e) of the 1934 Act
applied to securities fraud actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.52 But the Court’s answer was incomplete as it failed to resolve
(1) whether discovery meant actual discovery or encompassed the
idea of inquiry notice, and (2) what “facts” constituted the violation
that must be discovered. Thus, the courts of appeals returned to
47. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Jill E. Frisch, As Time
Goes By: New Questions About the Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
S101, S103-04 (1993). 
48. 843 F.2d 1537, 1543 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs.,
918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1390-92
(7th Cir. 1990). 
49. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1549 (“The necessity for uniform federal remedies in security
cases would seem to demand recourse to a uniform federal statute of limitations.”). 
50. Id. 
51. Norris, 818 F.2d at 1332. 
52. 501 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1991). The Supreme Court concluded that section 9(e) of the
1933 Act should apply to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims because there was a need for
uniformity, securities fraud actions are multi-state in nature, and section 9(e) shares the
same purpose—protecting investors against manipulation of stock prices—and similar
elements with section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 360-61. 
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old habits with the statute of limitations and divided—on both
questions—again. 
1. “Discovery” 
After Lampf, scholars were in agreement: the Supreme Court’s
endorsement of section 9(e) meant that the statute of limitations
was triggered upon actual discovery, not constructive discovery.53
The Third and Ninth Circuits arguably agreed,54 but the majority
of circuits did not, concluding that “inquiry notice”—a version of
constructive discovery—was the appropriate standard.55 Inquiry
notice is the “point at which [plaintiffs] possess[ ] a quantum of
information sufficiently suggestive of wrongdoing,” that they should
investigate “to confirm the existence of [their] claim.”56 The courts
concluding that the statute of limitations was triggered upon
inquiry notice were concerned that if the standard was actual
discovery, investors would wait to see whether a poorly performed
53. E.g., Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
607, 620, 625; Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule 10b-5 and Its New Statute
of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51 BUS. LAW. 309, 313, 333-34 (1996);
Roy M. Van Cleave, The Federal Securities Acts’ One-Year Inquiry Notice Statute of
Limitations: Are the Scales Tipped Against Fraud Claimants?, 22 J. CORP. L. 79, 80-81
(1996); Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1009
(1998). 
54. See Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d 960, 964 n.4 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that the
Third Circuit’s Data Access decision does not provide for inquiry notice); see also In re NAHC,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1318 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the Third Circuit had not
yet precisely decided the statute of limitations issue); Berry v. Valence Tech., Inc., 175 F.3d
699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999) (expressing doubts that the inquiry-notice standard survived Lampf). 
55. E.g., Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 450 F.3d 1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir.
2006); Shah v. Meeker, 435 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2006); Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 126
F. App’x 593, 597 (4th Cir. 2005); New Eng. Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst
& Young, L.L.P., 336 F.3d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 2003); LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins.
Group, Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2003); In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d at 1325;
Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002); Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228
(11th Cir. 2001); Ritchey v. Horner, 244 F.3d 635, 638-39 (8th Cir. 2001); Sterlin v. Biomune
Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 1998); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d
659, 670 (7th Cir. 1998); Marks v. CDW Computer Ctrs., Inc., 122 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir.
1997); Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954
F.2d 1125, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1992). 
56. Brief for the Petitioners at 20, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010) (No.
08-905), 2009 WL 2459589. 
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stock recovered, then reap investment profits if it did, and sue for
damages if it did not.57 Whether a plaintiff was on inquiry notice
involved a two-step analysis: 
(1) First, when did the plaintiff receive sufficient information of
possible wrongdoing such that a reasonable investor would
undertake an investigation to determine if a legal claim exists
(“inquiry notice”); [and] 
(2) [Second,] when thereafter, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should the plaintiff have discovered the facts constitut-
ing the violation.58 
The idea of inquiry notice is less than clear, and the courts of
appeals disagreed over many aspects of it. The courts could not
agree on the doctrinal reasons for rejecting an actual discovery
standard.59 And the application was even more divided: some cir-
cuits held that the statute of limitations began when the plaintiff
was on inquiry notice—that is, when the facts suggested possible
wrongdoing.60 In contrast, other circuits stated that the statute of
limitations began after the plaintiff, exercising reasonable diligence,
57. E.g., New Eng. Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 336 F.3d at 499; Sterlin, 154
F.3d at 1202; Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1993);
Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1993). 
58. Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Revisiting the Limitations Period for
Securities Fraud, 241 N.Y.L.J. 3 (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202431372080. 
59. See Ritchey, 244 F.3d at 638 (finding inquiry-notice standard in section 13 of the 1933
Act); Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1997) (same);
Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 722 (finding inquiry-notice standard through “judicial creativity”);
Menowitz v. Brown, 911 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (finding inquiry-notice
standard within the meaning of the word “discovery” in section 9(e) of the 1934 Act); Howard
v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1992) (accepting inquiry-notice standard without
explanation); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1441 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding
inquiry-notice standard impliedly adopted in Lampf even though not in section 9(e)). 
60. E.g., GO Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2007); Franze
v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2002); Theoharous, 256 F.3d at
1228; Brumbaugh, 985 F.2d at 162-63. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits likewise start the
statute of limitations clock at the first sign of “storm warnings,” if a reasonably diligent
inquiry could have uncovered the facts supporting a fraud claim within the limitations
period. E.g., Great Rivers Coop., 120 F.3d at 896, 898-99 (starting the limitations clock on the
“storm warnings” date); Bodenhamer v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 92-2392, 1993
WL 277033, at *2 (5th Cir. July 14, 1993) (nonprecedential decision); Jensen v. Snellings, 841
F.2d 600, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1988).
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could have discovered the facts constituting the violation.61 And
courts that adopted this latter approach were likewise divided over
whether “reasonable diligence” was measured objectively, subjec-
tively, or both.62 In some circuits, inquiry notice involved burden-
shifting: once the defendant established that the plaintiffs were on
inquiry notice, the plaintiffs had to show that they exercised rea-
sonable due diligence but were unable to discover their injuries.63
The Second Circuit adopted an approach all its own: if the plaintiff
was on inquiry notice and failed to conduct an investigation, the
statute of limitations began on the date the plaintiff was placed on
inquiry notice;64 but if the plaintiff investigated, the statute of
limitations began when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have
discovered the facts constituting the violation.65
2. “The Facts Constituting the Violation” 
Yet the debate over how to interpret discovery overshadowed a
more fundamental question concerning the statute: what does the
plaintiff need to discover? To state a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff
must allege and prove six elements: (1) that the defendant made a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) that the defendant
acted with a wrongful state of mind (scienter); (3) that the material
misrepresentation or omission was made in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) that the plaintiff relied on the
material misrepresentation; (5) that the plaintiff suffered an
economic loss as a result; and (6) that the material misrepresenta-
61. E.g., New Eng. Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 336 F.3d at 501; Young v.
Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8-10 (1st Cir. 2002); Sterlin, 154 F.3d at 1200-01; Fujisawa Pharm. Co.
v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1335 (7th Cir. 1997). 
62. Compare Young, 305 F.3d at 9 (stating that the plaintiff bears the burden of “showing
that she fulfilled her corresponding duty of making a reasonably diligent inquiry into the
possibility of fraudulent activity”), with Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d
553, 563 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005) (employing a strictly objective approach when examining what
information would be available to an investor who conducted a reasonably diligent
investigation); and Sterlin, 154 F.3d at 1202 n.20 (using strictly objective approach), with
Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 115 F.3d at 1335 (using both objective and subjective components in
assessing what information an investor in the plaintiff’s position could have uncovered had
it investigated possible fraud). 
63. In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 543 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2008). 
64. Shah v. Meeker, 435 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006). 
65. LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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tion actually caused the loss.66 The majority of courts concluded
that plaintiffs had to have only sufficient “storm warnings”67—
knowledge of suspicious facts—to trigger a duty to investigate, and
that once a reasonably diligent investigation would have discovered
these suspicious facts, the statute of limitations began.68 Most
circuits were less than clear, though, regarding whether storm
warnings or suspicious facts included scienter.69 
C. Congress and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In 2001, the landscape of corporate regulation changed when
massive corporate scandals rocked investor confidence in the capital
markets. When corporate giants Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia
crumbled amid allegations of years of crooked accounting, Congress
responded with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.70 SOX was sig-
nificant on many fronts, most notably creating stringent reporting
requirements aimed at otherwise lax corporate oversight.71 SOX
66. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); see Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). Section 11 claims, in contrast, do not require proof of reliance,
causation, or scienter, but only materiality and damages. E.g., Alpern v. UtiliCorp United,
Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1541 (8th Cir. 1996). Loss causation is not an element of a section 11
claim, but an affirmative defense to it. See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2006); Ind. State Dist. Council
of Laborers v. Omnicare, Inc., 583 F.3d 935, 947 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. dismissed, 178 L. Ed.
2d 411 (2010). 
67. For a full discussion of “storm warnings,” see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Supreme
Court and the Mission To Restrict Investor Protection: Merck v. Reynolds (Part 6: The
Misguided Concept of Inquiry Notice) (June 22, 2009), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/
securities-issues/the-supreme-court-and-the-mission-to-restrict-investor-prote-7.html. 
68. New Eng. Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 336 F.3d
495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2002). 
69. For example, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that the plaintiff had to have known
(or should have known) facts that would establish scienter. Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113
F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1997) (“In a fraud case, [the plaintiff] needs to know ... that the
defendant has made a representation that was knowingly false. When the plaintiff knows or
should know this, the statute of limitations begins to run.”); see also Sudo Props., Inc. v.
Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t, 503 F.3d 371, 375, 377-78 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating inquiry
notice was not triggered by plaintiff’s knowledge that defendant’s predictions were “grossly
incorrect,” until plaintiff “learned for the first time that [defendant] had intentionally misled
him”). 
70. See generally ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL
READER (Nancy B. Rapoport et al., eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
71. SOX had several effects on corporate governance. The law (1) required principal
executive officers to certify that certain reports contained no false or misleading information,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a); (2) provided criminal penalties if the
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also expanded the statute of limitations applicable to most private
remedies under the securities laws.72 For section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claims, SOX provided a two-year statute of limitations and a
five-year statute of repose.73 The language adopted by Congress was
similar to the language used in section 9(e) of the 1934 Act.74 
Congress thus lengthened the one-and-three-year structure
adopted in Lampf. In its report on SOX, the Senate Judiciary
Committee expressed concern that the one-and-three-year structure
“unfairly limit[ed] recovery for defrauded investors in some cases,”75
noting that some states were forced to forgo their claims against
Enron, for example, because of the statute of limitations.76 The
Committee was also concerned that the complexity and nature of
securities fraud made these claims difficult to detect.77 Additionally,
the Committee observed that plaintiffs faced significant procedural
CEO knowingly certified false information, id. § 906, 15 U.S.C. § 1350(c); and (3) mandated
that each annual report filed by a company contain a report on internal controls established
to guard against fraud, id. § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)-(b). 
SOX has been criticized as “quack corporate governance,” see generally Roberta Romano,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521
(2005), and as nonresponsive because, ironically, had SOX been in effect, Enron would have
met all of its requirements, JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 79-85 (2008). But others have been quick to defend the law. See generally
J. Robert Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack Corporate
Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309 (2006); Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years
Later: Hero or Villain, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 525, 526 (2008) (concluding “the policy behind
Sarbanes-Oxley is essential for the proper functioning of efficient capital markets”). 
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b); see also HAZEN, supra note 45. 
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (“[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the
securities laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be brought not later than the earlier of ... (1) 2 years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.”). 
74. Compare id., with 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e). 
75. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 8 (2002).
76. Id. (“As Washington State Attorney General Gregoire testified at the Committee
hearing, in the Enron state pension fund litigation, the current short statute of limitations
has forced some states to forgo claims against Enron based on alleged securities fraud in
1997 and 1998. In Washington state alone, the short statute of limitations may cost hard-
working state employees, firefighters and police officers nearly $50 million in lost Enron
investments, which they will never recover.”). 
77. Id. at 9 (“[T]he best cons are designed so that even after victims are cheated, they will
not know who cheated them, or how.”); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 377 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Ponzi schemes, for
example, can maintain the illusion of a profit-making enterprise for years, and sophisticated
investors may not be able to discover the fraud until long after its perpetration.”). 
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obstacles under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), including its lead-plaintiff selection process,78 its stay of
discovery pending a motion to dismiss79—“consideration of which
can take over a year in itself ”80—and its heightened pleading
standards.81 The Committee worried that by the time plaintiff-
investors had learned enough facts to file a complaint capable of
surviving a motion to dismiss and to begin discovery, the claim was
likely to be time barred.82 To allow plaintiffs time to adequately
investigate their claims and to file meritorious suits, the Committee
proposed, and Congress accepted, lengthening the statute of
limitations.83
But Congress’s expanded limitations period left the phrase
“discovery of the facts constituting the violation” undefined,84 and
the courts of appeals still had to determine whether discovery
meant actual discovery or something else. After SOX, two circuits
changed their approaches. The Ninth Circuit in Betz v. Trainer
Wortham & Co. and the Third Circuit in In re Merck & Co. held
that plaintiff-investors must have actual knowledge that the
defendant made misrepresentations with scienter before incurring
any duty to investigate.85 These cases thus presented yet another
approach to the statute of limitations. The defendants in Merck
asked the Supreme Court to weigh in,86 and the Court granted a
writ of certiorari.87 
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)-(3), (7). 
79. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3).
80. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 9.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2). 
82. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 9.
83. Id. at 9-10. The Senate Judiciary Committee also observed that a short statute of
limitations invites defendants to take sophisticated steps to conceal their deceit—a point
proved right by Enron. Id. (“[I]t only takes a few seconds to warm up the shredder.”).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
85. Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d 863, 873 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
2400 (2010); In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 543 F.3d 150, 172 (3d Cir.
2008). Three judges on the Ninth Circuit dissented from the circuit’s refusal to rehear the
case en banc, arguing that the approach adopted in Betz was in conflict with all ten other
circuits. Betz, 519 F.3d at 865 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of the petition to
rehear the case en banc). 
86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35-36, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784
(2010) (No. 08-905), 2009 WL 133458. 
87. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 129 S. Ct. 2432 (2009). The Supreme Court, after Merck,
granted the writ of certiorari in Betz and immediately remanded to the Ninth Circuit for
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II. MERCK & CO. V. REYNOLDS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Despite the Supreme Court’s initial attempt in Lampf to define
the statute of limitations and Congress’s remedial legislation in
SOX, the standard remained in flux.88 In Merck, the Court again
entered the fray and clarified that a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
action accrues “(1) when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or
(2) when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, the
facts constituting the violation—whichever comes first,”89 and that
“[f]acts constituting the violation” include scienter.90 This Article
recounts the case in some detail because the decision serves as
background for later discussion. 
A. Vioxx, Heart Attacks, and Stock Fraud
In May 1999, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
Vioxx, a potential “blockbuster” painkiller developed by Merck that
was used to treat arthritis and other acute pain.91 Merck touted
Vioxx in press releases, public statements, and SEC filings as
possessing all the beneficial effects of traditional pain relievers, but
without the harmful gastrointestinal side effects associated with
those drugs.92 Before the FDA approved Vioxx though, some Merck
officials were concerned that the drug could cause heart attacks, or
“cardiovascular events.”93 Accordingly, Merck began a study com-
paring Vioxx with the active ingredient in other pain relievers—
naproxen—and discovered that Vioxx users had a higher incidence
further consideration in light of Merck. Trainer Wortham & Co. v. Betz, 130 S. Ct. 2400
(2010). 
88. See supra Part I.B (discussing the various approaches the federal courts of appeals
took to determine when the statute of limitations was triggered for securities fraud claims). 
89. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90. Id. at 1790 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)). 
91. In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 543 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2008).
Merck is the world’s second-biggest drug manufacturer by sales, with roughly $40 billion in
annual revenue since November 2009. Jesse J. Holland, Court Says Vioxx Lawsuit Can
Proceed, ABC NEWS, Apr. 27, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id =10486758. 
92. In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 153-54. 
93. Id. at 154. 
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of heart attacks than naproxen users.94 Merck disclosed the study’s
findings in a press release in March 2000.95 The company, however,
tried to soften this blow and advanced the “naproxen hypothe-
sis”—that the lower incidence of heart attacks for patients taking
naproxen was the result of a beneficial effect of naproxen, rather
than any harmful effect of Vioxx.96
In 2001, the FDA conducted a hearing to determine if the results
of Merck’s study must be incorporated into Vioxx’s labeling.97 That
same year, a group of plaintiffs brought a products-liability lawsuit
against Merck and another pharmaceutical company, alleging that
Vioxx and another pain reliever were marketed as effective pain
relievers, despite the fact that the companies’ own research demon-
strated that users of these drugs were more likely to suffer heart
attacks.98 At about this time, the Journal of the American Medical
Association picked up the results of Merck’s study and asserted that
Vioxx posed an increased risk of heart attack, garnering consider-
able media attention.99 Attracting additional media attention, the
FDA posted a warning letter that it had issued to Merck regarding
Vioxx.100 The letter stated that Merck’s promotional materials were
“false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading.”101 Then, in
94. Id. The study found that about four out of one thousand participants who took Vioxx
suffered heart attacks compared to only one out of one thousand who took naproxen. Merck,
130 S. Ct. at 1790. A later study linked Vioxx to more than 27,000 heart attacks nationwide
from the time it came on the market in 1999 through 2003. Rita Rubin, How Did Vioxx
Debacle Happen?, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/
2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm. A study by the New England Journal of Medicine on Vioxx
has also been criticized: the Journal “disclosed its concern about studies it had published
dealing with ... Vioxx,” because the “studies in question reported only selective data on heart
attacks and strokes” and did not mention the cardiovascular or overall dangers of Vioxx.
Charles W. Murdock, Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the Economic
Meltdown, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 801, 805 (2010). 
95. In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 154. 
96. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1791. Merck acknowledged that its “naproxen hypothesis” had
not been observed in any clinical studies. Id.
97. In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 155. 
98. Id. at 156. An additional lawsuit was brought in September 2001 alleging consumer
fraud on behalf of Vioxx users, and later a second product liability lawsuit was also brought.
Id. at 158. 
99. Id. at 156. 
100. Id. at 156-57.
101. Id. at 156. The FDA was largely criticized for its handling of the Vioxx situation. See,
e.g., Rubin, supra note 94. After the FDA warning letter was released, more products-liability
lawsuits were filed. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1791. 
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October 2001, the New York Times reported that Vioxx users may
have an increased risk of heart attack.102 
A few months later, in April 2002, the FDA required Merck to
disclose the risk of heart attack on Vioxx labels.103 A fall in Vioxx
sales ensued; Merck’s stock dropped 6.5 percent when Reuters
released a story on Merck’s trouble.104 The Wall Street Journal then
published an article that discussed an additional third-party study
that concluded Vioxx was linked to a 39 percent increase in the risk
of heart attack when compared with a competing pain reliever.105 
It was not until November 2003 that a group of investor-plaintiffs
filed a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action against Merck alleging
that the company, its officers, and its directors knowingly misrepre-
sented the heart attack risk associated with Vioxx.106 Merck later
withdrew Vioxx from the market, and Merck’s stock dropped an
additional 27 percent.107 In November 2004, the Wall Street Journal
reported that internal Merck e-mails showed that Merck fought for
years “to keep safety concerns over [Vioxx] from destroying the
drug’s commercial prospects.”108
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the
plaintiff-investors should have been alerted to the possibility of
Merck’s misrepresentation before November 2001 because
(1) Merck’s March 2000 study showed adverse cardiovascular
results for Vioxx; (2) the FDA’s warning letter in September 2001
stated Merck’s marketing campaign was false; and (3) users filed
products-liability actions in September and October 2001 that
alleged Merck intentionally downplayed risks of Vioxx.109 According
102. In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 158. 
103. Id. at 159. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. Researchers found that those given Vioxx for thirty to ninety days were 37 percent
more likely to have suffered a heart attack than those given either a different painkiller or
no painkiller at all. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1792. 
106. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1792. 
107. In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 159; see also Press Release, Merck, Merck Announces
Voluntary Worldwide Withdrawal of VIOXX (Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/vioxx_press_release_final.pdf. An estimated two
million people were taking Vioxx when it was pulled from the market. Rubin, supra note 94.
Shareholders lost a combined $28 billion when the price of Merck stock dropped after Vioxx
was pulled from the market. Holland, supra note 91. 
108. In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 159-60. 
109. In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423-24
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to the district court, investors had abundant public information that
would cause investor concerns and would put investors on inquiry
notice before November 2001.110 The Third Circuit, however, re-
versed the district court’s holding because the three events before
November 2001 did not suggest that Merck acted with scienter.111
B. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit that before
November 2001, the plaintiffs did not, and could not, discover the
facts constituting the violation.112 The Court reasoned that the FDA
warning letter showed little about whether Merck put forth the
naproxen hypothesis with fraudulent intent, and that the products-
liability lawsuits did not suggest that Merck knew the naproxen
hypothesis was false.113 In so doing, the Court made two notable
rulings: it defined both “discovery” and “the facts constituting the
violation,” effectively ending the circuit splits regarding section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims. 
1. “Discovery”
First, the Court clarified that the statute of limitations for section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 begins when the plaintiff actually discovered,
or reasonably should have discovered, the facts constituting the
violation—whichever comes first.114 The Court reasoned that SOX
implicitly incorporated constructive discovery because “discovery”
was traditionally a term of art that encompassed both actual and
constructive discovery,115 and, according to the majority, every court
(D.N.J. 2007). 
110. Id. at 424. 
111. In re Merck & Co., 543 F.3d at 172. Judge Roth dissented and concluded that there
were sufficient storm warnings more than two years before the filing of the complaint that
put the plaintiffs on inquiry notice of fraud. Id. at 173 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
112. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1798-99 (2010). 
113. Id. at 1799. 
114. Id. at 1793, 1796. Justice Stevens concurred, but opined that in this case there was
no difference between the time when the plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the
facts to support their claim, and as such, the Court should have waited until a case came
before it in which the difference between the actual discovery rule and the constructive
discovery rule would affect the outcome. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
115. Id. at 1793-95.
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of appeals held this before SOX.116 The Court then put the concept
of inquiry notice to rest because inquiry notice—the point at which
facts would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate a
possible fraud—was not necessarily the time at which a plaintiff
would have discovered the fraud.117 And this, the Court continued,
could not be reconciled with the statute’s text that states a plain-
tiff’s claim accrues after discovery.118 
2. “The Facts Constituting the Violation”
The Supreme Court also clarified that the “facts constituting the
violation” include scienter, or the defendant’s mental state.119 This
is so, reasoned the Court, because scienter is an essential element
to Rule 10b-5 claims, a fact emphasized when Congress enacted
heightened pleading requirements for scienter in the PSLRA.120 The
Court expressed concern that “[s]o long as a defendant concealed for
two years that he made a misstatement with an intent to deceive,
the limitations period would expire before the plaintiff had actually
‘discovered’ the fraud.”121
The Court declined to address whether reliance and loss causa-
tion were also facts “constitut[ing] the violation.”122 But the Court
left open the possibility that plaintiffs may be on notice of fraud
solely by the materiality of a representation when it observed that
“[i]t is unlikely ... that someone would falsely say ‘I am not married’
without being aware of the fact that his statement is false,” thereby
suggesting scienter.123 The Court noted, however, that an incorrect
prediction about a firm’s future earnings by itself was insufficient
to suggest scienter.124 
116. Id. at 1794-95. 
117. Id. at 1797.
118. Id. For this same reason, the Court rejected Merck’s fall-back argument “that even
if the limitations period does generally begin at ‘discovery,’ it should nonetheless run from
the point of ‘inquiry’” notice if the plaintiff fails to undertake a diligent investigation—it
could not be reconciled with the text of the statute. Id. at 1797-98.
119. Id. at 1796. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1796-97. 
124. Id. at 1797 (“An incorrect prediction about a firm’s future earnings, by itself, does not
automatically tell us whether the speaker deliberately lied or just made an innocent (and
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3. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
Justice Scalia has been forthright with his distaste for implied
private rights of action in general125 and is often regarded as a pro-
business judge.126 But in Merck, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, advocated for an actual discovery standard, a more
plaintiff-friendly approach.127 He disagreed with the majority that
therefore nonactionable) error.”). 
125. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) (declining to recognize
implied right of action); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77-78 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court should abandon implied rights of action
entirely); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing for a “categorical position that federal private rights of action will not be implied”).
126. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947,
972 (2008) (“Preemption issues create an opportunity for an unusual coalition between more
liberal Justices, like Stephen Breyer, who favor more expansive national power, and con-
servative Justices, like Antonin Scalia and John Roberts, who are strongly pro-business.”);
Minutes from a Convention of The Federalist Society, The Roberts Court and Federalism, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 330, 343 (2009) (quoting Professor Jeffrey Rosen as stating “Justice
Scalia has always tended to be more of a pro-business conservative than a libertarian, states'
rights conservative, beginning with his days as the editor of Regulation magazine, which
many called Deregulation, and tracing back to a particular date in 1984 when he debated
Richard Epstein at the Cato Institute”); Pamela Jones Harbour, The Supreme Court’s
Antitrust Future: New Directions or Revisiting Old Cases?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2007,
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/12/Dec07-Harbour12-17.pdf (“The Court is now
undeniably ‘conservative’ in a way that would be comfortable to the Reagan Administration.
Five Republican appointees—Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Associate Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito—anchor a solidly
conservative and pro-business majority for this Court.”).
127. Justice Scalia has been on the more plaintiff-friendly side of the statute of limitations
debate for securities fraud before. In Lampf, Justice Scalia argued in concurrence that
“absent a congressionally created limitations period state periods govern, or, if they are
inconsistent with the purposes of the federal Act, no limitations period exists.” Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). But he tempered this statement and instead thought it best to adopt the
statute of limitations set forth in the 1934 Act. Justice Scalia stated,
[T]he unintended and possibly irrational results [of holding that there is no
statute of limitations] will certainly deter judicial invention of causes of action.
That is not an unworthy goal, but to pursue it in that fashion would be highly
unjust to those who must litigate past inventions. An alternative approach
would be to say that since we “implied” the cause of action we ought to “imply”
an appropriate statute of limitations as well. That is just enough, but too
lawless to be imagined.... [T]he most responsible approach, where the
enactment that has been the occasion for our creation of a cause of action
contains a limitations period for an analogous cause of action, is to use that. We
are imagining here. And I agree with the Court that we can imagine no clearer
indication of how Congress would have balanced the policy considerations
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the statute of limitations starts upon either actual or constructive
discovery, arguing that the statute of limitations begins only if the
plaintiffs actually discovered the fraud.128 He pointed to the statute
of limitations for section 11 and section 12 claims that states these
claims must be “brought within one year after the discovery of the
untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should
have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”129 In the
context of section 11 and section 12 claims, Justice Scalia pointed
out, “discovery” cannot mean constructive discovery because it
would render the second phrase superfluous.130 Justice Scalia also
found good reason for the actual discovery rule because scienter, as
an element to Rule 10b-5 actions, is more difficult to discover than
the elements of section 11 or section 12 claims, which involve only
whether an untrue statement was made in a prospectus or registra-
tion statement.131
In addition, Justice Scalia took issue with the majority’s claim
that the federal appellate courts all agreed that the statute of
limitations for section 10(b) claims meant “constructive discovery.”
First, Justice Scalia noted that it was unrealistic to assume that
both houses of Congress knew of and agreed with the federal
appellate courts; and even if they had, their “collective intent” could
not trump the plain text of the statute they enacted.132 Second,
implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck by the same
Congress in limiting similar and related protections.
Id. at 365-66 (internal quotations omitted). 
128. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1801-02 (Scalia, J., concurring). Faculty at law and business
schools argued that regardless of actual or constructive discovery, “[t]he substance of the
underlying claim presumes that members of the class are aware of the facts known to the
market.” Therefore, “[t]o the extent the market is aware of the fraud,” the limitations period
would begin. Brief of Amici Curiae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of
Respondents at 34, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905), 2009 WL 3477293. 
129. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia observed that “[t]o interpret
§ 1658(b)(1) as imposing a constructive-discovery standard, one must therefore assume,
contrary to common sense, that the same word means two very different things in the same
statutory context of limitations periods for securities-fraud actions under the 1933 and 1934
Acts.” Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1800. 
130. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1800-01. 
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1802. This is a point Justice Scalia has made before. See, e.g., Zedner v. United
States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-10 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he only language that
constitutes ‘a Law’ within the meaning of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause of
Article I, § 7, and hence the only language adopted in a fashion that entitles it to our
attention, is the text of the enacted statute.”); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,
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Justice Scalia stated that the appellate courts were in fact divided
over their interpretation of “discovery” under the statute of
limitations.133
C. The Reach of Merck and Subprime Litigation
The reach of Merck thus far is unclear. To the extent that the
time from the end of the alleged class period until the plaintiffs file
their complaint is a proxy for the likelihood that a statute of
limitations defense will arise, filing statistics suggest that histori-
cally, the statute of limitations has not been much of an issue. That
is consistent with the idea that Merck will affect only a few outlier
securities class actions that are filed late. According to Cornerstone
Research, between 1997 and 2008, the median time between the
plaintiff ’s complaint and the end of the class period was twenty-
eight days.134 NERA Economic Consulting also reported that “[t]he
majority of complaints in securities class actions are filed within
the three-month period after the end of the alleged class period.”135
Although these statistics suggest that Merck may have limited
application, more recent filing statistics suggest that the period
between the filing of the plaintiffs’ first complaint and the end of
the class period has been lengthening. For example, Cornerstone
Research found that although the median filing lag between 1997
and 2008 was twenty-eight days, for 2009 the median filing lag was
sixty-four days; and in the last half of 2009, the median filing lag
was one hundred days.136 NERA reported a longer delay in general,
but also found an upward trend as of late: for the past three years,
an average of 161 days passed from the end of the class period to
504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[Legislative history is] that last hope of lost
interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction.”). For a full
discussion of the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history, see David S. Law & David
Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1653 (2010). 
133. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1802-03 (Scalia J., concurring); see also supra Part I.B (discussing
the varied approaches the courts of appeals adopted). 
134. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2009: A YEAR IN REVIEW
6 (2009).
135. STEPHANIE PLANCICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2009 YEAR-END UPDATE 8 (2009), available at http://www.nera
.com/extImage/Recent_Trends_Report_01.10.pdf.
136. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 134, at 6. 
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the time the plaintiff filed their complaint.137 But in the last half of
2009, the average time increased to 279 days with only 69 percent
of cases filed within one year.138 These statistics suggest that the
statute of limitations may be more of an issue now than before.
Indeed, the percentage of filings with a one-year lag or more has
increased steadily from 5 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2009,139
and the percentage of filings with a lag of less than six months has
fallen from 86 percent in 2005 to 71 percent in 2009.140
One area in which the statute of limitations may prove particu-
larly significant is the ongoing litigation surrounding the subprime
meltdown and the credit crisis.141 According to Kevin LaCroix,
author of the highly respected legal blog the D&O Diary, “[a]s we
move forward in time and the crisis-related events recede further
into the past, additional filings increasingly may raise questions of
timeliness. Statute of limitations questions are already arising in
some of these cases ... and they are increasingly likely to arise in
future cases.”142 LaCroix also observes that many securities fraud
cases had been put on the back burner by plaintiff-investors
because of the urgency of the credit crisis, and that now, these
claims are resurfacing.143 These too will likely raise statute of
limitations issues. In sum, filing statistics and the credit crisis
137. PLANCICH & STARYKH, supra note 135, at 8-9.
138. Id. at 9. NERA hypothesized that this increased lag is temporary: plaintiffs were
focused on the large credit crisis litigation over the past two years and only now are
returning to other noncredit crisis cases with older class periods. Id. at 9. This hypothesis,
though, remains to be tested.
139. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 134, at 7.
140. Id.
141. Kevin LaCroix, The Sands of Time: An Interesting New Subprime Securities Suit,
The D&O Diary (May 26, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/05/articles/subprime-
litigation/the-sands-of-time-an-interesting-new-subprime-securities-suit/; Kevin LaCroix,
Who’s Getting Hit With Securities Suits These Days, The D&O Diary (May 17, 2010),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/05/articles/securities-litigation/whos-getting-hit-with-
securities-suits-these-days/; Kevin LaCroix, U.S. Supreme Court Allows Merck Vioxx
Securities Suit to Proceed, The D&O Diary (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/
2010/04/articles/securities-litigation/us-supreme-court-allows-merck-vioxx-securities-suit-to-
proceed/; see also Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d
475, 479-81 (2010). 
142. LaCroix, U.S. Supreme Court Allows Merck Vioxx Securities Suit to Proceed, supra
note 141; see, e.g., Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Miss., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 479-81. 
143. E.g., LaCroix, The Sands of Time: An Interesting New Subprime Securities Suit,
supra note 141; LaCroix, Who’s Getting Hit With Securities Suits These Days, supra note
141. 
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litigation suggest that Merck’s impact will not be limited to a few
cases. 
           III. THE DANGERS OF MERCK AND ABOLISHING         
DISCOVERY-ACCRUAL
Merck was quickly heralded as a victory for plaintiffs,144 mainly
because the outcome could have been worse: the Court could have
concluded that the statute of limitations is triggered when a
plaintiff-investor is on inquiry notice145—a vague and malleable
concept that starts the clock when a plaintiff is alerted to the
possibility that fraud might be afoot. Still, Part III explores the
pitfalls of Merck. This Part shows that Merck precludes the pros-
ecution of meritorious securities fraud claims because it sets up a
pleading trap for plaintiffs that may force devastating concessions
or expose attorneys to Rule 11 sanctions. Part III also examines
whether the discovery provision interpreted in Merck is necessary
at all and concludes that it is not. As this Part demonstrates, the
discovery provision fails to spur prompt filing, rests on the un-
founded assumption that plaintiffs have discovered their claim but
intentionally delayed filing, and imposes a procedural cost with no
corresponding benefit. 
144. E.g., Brent Kendall, Suit Against Merck Allowed to Proceed, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703832204575210000606165846.html
(“David C. Frederick, who argued the case for the plaintiffs, said the ruling ‘is a wonderful
decision and we look forward to litigating the merits in the district court.’ ... Tuesday's ruling
against Merck may knock out the timeliness argument as a line of defense for companies
fending off investor lawsuits.”); LaCroix, U.S. Supreme Court Allows Merck Vioxx Securities
Suit to Proceed, supra note 141 (“[T]he Court’s opinion definitely is helpful to the plaintiffs.
In recent years, the Court has developed a reputation as hostile to private securities
lawsuits. Without a doubt, the Court has issued a series of decisions (Tellabs, Stoneridge,
Twombley/Iqbal, Dura, etc.) that have proved helpful to defendants. But the Court’s opinion
in the Merck case is not only helpful to the plaintiffs in that case but it likely will prove
useful to plaintiffs in other cases as well.”); Tony Mauro, Merck Shareholder Suit Timely,
Justices Rule, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 28, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 8734527
(stating that Merck is beneficial for plaintiffs); Kevin C. Newsom & J. Thomas Richie, Amicus
Update: Supreme Court Decision Spells Increased Difficulty for Defendants in Securities Law
Claims, DRI: THE VOICE OF THE DEFENSE BAR, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.dri.org/open/
Article.aspx?ID=311 (“[D]efendants will have a more difficult time than in the past showing
that securities law claims are time-barred, which will augment risks in litigation and
increase discovery costs.”). 
145. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 56, at 16-33 (arguing that the statute of
limitations begins when the plaintiff was alerted to the possibility of fraud). 
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A. The Problematic Incorporation of Scienter
The Supreme Court’s securities fraud jurisprudence since Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores146 has been consistent in one
regard: it has rejected the expansion of remedies afforded to
investors for securities fraud and limited the exposure of defen-
dants to securities fraud liability.147 What then explains Merck?
Does the case represent a paradigm shift in favor of plaintiff-
investors, possibly the result of the recent financial disaster? It is
possible that this scandal, which led to a loss of confidence in the
market, translated into a difference in judicial attitude.148 Although
that is possible, Merck is not a paradigm shift at all. The decision
does little to help investors; rather, it allows defendants to use
scienter offensively and puts plaintiffs in a perilous pleading
position. 
Part III.A first shows that by incorporating scienter, Merck has
given defendants a tool to trigger the statute of limitations—they
can invoke the collective scienter and core operations theories to
argue that the plaintiffs constructively discovered their fraud
earlier.149 This Section also cautions plaintiffs of Merck’s pleading
trap. Plaintiffs must craft alleged misrepresentations as actionable
in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but must also
146. 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting private damages action under Rule 10b-5 to actual
purchasers or sellers of securities).
147. Michael J. Kaufman, Mending the Weathered Jurisdictional Fences in the Supreme
Court’s Securities Fraud Decisions, 49 SMU L. REV. 159, 188-89 (1996). The Supreme Court’s
most recent trilogy may easily be added to the chart showing this trend. See Stoneridge Invs.
Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159-64 (2008) (rejecting scheme
liability); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322-23 (2007)
(heightening the pleading standard by requiring district courts to weigh both culpable and
nonculpable inferences of scienter at the motion to dismiss stage); Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-44 (2005) (stating that a securities fraud plaintiff cannot plead loss
causation simply by alleging in the complaint, and later establishing, that the price of the
security on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation). 
148. Some commentators have argued that Merck and the recent cases decided since Dura
are consistent in that they all represent the Court’s approach to “judicial conservatism,
grounded in statutory language.” Jordan Eth et al., Justices Focus on Language in Cases Like
‘Merck,’ RECORDER, Apr. 30, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 8952438. But Merck adopted a
constructive discovery standard—the statute contains no language suggesting that the
standard should be constructive as opposed to actual discovery. Justice Scalia’s concurrence
argued just that point. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1800-01 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). 
149. See infra Part III.A.1.
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tread carefully to avoid triggering the statute of limitations.150
Conceding that earlier misrepresentations were not made with
scienter—or were not evidence of it—may force plaintiffs to rely on
fewer indicia of the corporate defendant’s culpable mental state, or
force plaintiffs into pleading fraud by hindsight. Another danger is
that if plaintiffs file before the event they claim provided them with
sufficient evidence of scienter, they may set themselves up for Rule
11 sanctions. Last, Part III.A shows that Merck failed to establish
a uniform statute of limitations when it incorporated scienter—the
federal courts have no common requirements for alleging and
proving a company’s mental state for securities fraud.151
1. Scienter on the Offensive: Collective Scienter and Core 
Operations
The statute of limitations will be significant in future securities
fraud actions.152 But this may be to plaintiffs’ detriment. Merck held
that the statute of limitations does not begin until the plaintiff has,
or should have, discovered the facts constituting the violation,
which include scienter.153 This appears to be a victory for plain-
tiffs—the statute does not begin on the possibility of fraud, but
rather upon the discovery of actual fraud. But “[a]ll that glisters is
not gold,”154 and the Court’s seemingly pro-plaintiff standard pro-
vides a formidable weapon for defendants: scienter can be used
offensively, and methods of imputing scienter, such as the collective
scienter theory and the core operations inference, can be used to
trigger constructive discovery. 
Scienter is usually pleaded with circumstantial evidence.155 At
the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, without the benefit of discovery,156 it is hard
150. See infra Part III.A.2.
151. See infra Part III.A.3.
152. See supra Part II.C (describing how filing statistics and anecdotal evidence suggest
that the statute of limitations may become increasingly important for future securities
claims). 
153. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (majority opinion). 
154. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 7, L. 65 (David
Bevington & David Scott Kastan eds., Bantam Classic 2005).
155. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983). 
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (automatically staying discovery pending the
resolution of a defendant’s motion to dismiss).
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to imagine another way that plaintiffs might plead the defendant-
company’s mental state with the sufficient particularity that the
PSLRA demands.157 Plaintiffs often rely on methods for courts to
infer scienter or impute knowledge. Two popular methods include
the “collective scienter” theory and the “core operations inference.”
Under the collective scienter theory, or “group pleading doctrine,”
a court will impute scienter to officers and directors if they had day-
to-day control or involvement in regular company operations and
misstatements appeared in group-published documents, including
annual reports and press releases.158 This means a plaintiff can
show a defendant-company acted with scienter without specifically
naming the persons who concocted and disseminated the fraud.159
Although most courts have rejected this method of imputing
knowledge—finding it inconsistent with the PSLRA’s requirement
that plaintiffs allege facts with particularity160—it is accepted in
some circuits.161 
157. See id. at § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (requiring the plaintiff to plead with particularity facts
demonstrating a strong inference of scienter). The federal appellate courts have likewise
curbed plaintiffs’ use of confidential informants in securities fraud, which was a critical tool
plaintiffs used to investigate potential stock fraud and meet the PSLRA’s heightened
pleading requirements. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the
Continuing Controversy Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud
Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 646-61 (2010) [hereinafter Kaufman &
Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy Regarding Confidential Informants];
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Proper
Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 345, 351-57
(2008) [hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Proper
Role of Confidential Informants]; Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption and the
Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court—The Tortuous Path from Central Bank to
Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 186 (2009). 
158. Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 335 (3d Cir. 2007). 
159. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir.
2008).
160. See, e.g., Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008); Ind. Elec.
Workers’ Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 2008);
Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 693 (7th Cir. 2008); Winer Family Trust, 503 F.3d at 335;
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs I), 437 F.3d 588, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d
353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004); In re Apple Computer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1023
(N.D. Cal. 2002). 
161. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531
F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008) (indicating a willingness to allow a plaintiff “to raise the required
inference [of scienter] with regard to a corporate defendant without doing so with regard to
a specific individual defendant”); City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp.,
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Similarly, the core operations inference suggests the defendant
acted with scienter if the misrepresentation concerns a “core oper-
ation” of the defendant’s business.162 Officers can be assumed to
know the “facts critical to a business’s core operations or to an im-
portant transaction that would affect a company’s performance.”163
By way of example, 
[s]uppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million
SUVs in 2006, and the actual number was zero. There would be
a strong inference of corporate scienter, since so dramatic an
announcement would have been approved by corporate officials
sufficiently knowledgeable about the company to know that the
announcement was false.164
 
Both the collective scienter and the core operations theories lead to
the inference that the defendant must have known the facts
surrounding the misstatement because it would be absurd to sug-
gest otherwise—or at the very least, it would suggest the defen-
dants were negligent in their ignorance.165 
In Merck, the Court left open the possibility that defendants
could use these methods to their advantage. The Court’s marriage
hypothetical implies that it would be absurd to suggest that there
are certain statements made without knowledge of their falsity.166
399 F.3d 651, 688 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[K]nowledge of a corporate officer or agent acting within
the scope of his authority is attributable to the corporation.”); Schwartz v. Celestial
Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that plaintiff-investors need
not “match” specific misstatements to specific officers or directors).
162. See HAZEN, supra note 45, § 12.8[4][D]. According to the Ninth Circuit, allegations
regarding a company’s core operations may be relevant to scienter in three circumstances:
(1) where the defendant has actual knowledge of the information; (2) where it would be
absurd to conclude that the defendants did not know the information; and (3) where the
allegations taken together raise a cogent and compelling standard of scienter. S. Ferry LP
No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2008). 
163. Jones v. Corus Bankshares, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Sec. Litig., 291 F. Supp. 2d
722, 727 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
164. Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710.
165. See Pittleman v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-0970 AG (MLGx), 2009
WL 648983, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009); see also Zucco Partners, L.L.C. v. Digimarc Corp.,
552 F.3d 981, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the core operations inference would
apply if a “fact is of such prominence that it would be ‘absurd’ to suggest that management
was without knowledge” of it). 
166. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796-97 (2010) (“We recognize that certain
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And if plaintiffs can invoke these methods to impute scienter to
defendants, nothing prevents defendants from doing so as well.167
Thus, defendants may point to earlier misrepresentations and
argue that these statements concerned a “core operation” of the
company’s business and that scienter could have been inferred
therefrom. For example, if GM announces in 2006 that the number
of cars it sold was one million when the actual number was zero,
under the “core operations” inference this constitutes scienter that
a reasonable investor would be aware of—even though the plaintiffs
may not actually have discovered that this statement was fraudu-
lent until 2010. 
2. The Pleading Game Plaintiffs Cannot Win
There is another reason to be suspect of Merck: it creates a
pleading trap for plaintiffs that forces them to concede essential
facts and sets their claims up for resolution on a motion to dismiss.
The Court’s decision does not address this pleading issue. Omitting
scienter from the statute of limitations inquiry may have been
beneficial to plaintiffs as they could hide behind the vagueness of
the inquiry-notice standard. But now, parties will argue over the
precise point at which a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have
pieced together enough information sufficient to show scienter. 
First, although the defendant bears the burden of proving the
statute of limitations issue as an affirmative defense,168 scienter is
an element of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, which the plaintiff must
statements are such that, to show them false is normally to show scienter as well. It is
unlikely, for example, that someone would falsely say ‘I am not married’ without being aware
of the fact that his statement is false.”). 
167. Indeed, Justice Kennedy was skeptical of just the inverse and stated at oral argument
that “the companies can’t have it both ways. They can’t endorse the Twombly case and then
say just an inquiry notice of a general — of a general nature suffices. You have to have
specific evidence of scienter. And there’s nothing here to indicate that the plaintiffs had that.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-905.pdf. 
168. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense and the defendant bears the burden of proof). At the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage, defendants may argue that the statute of limitations had run only on the
narrative in the complaint. See Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir.
1997). But later on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant may prove its assertion
that the statute of limitations had begun with evidence of its own. Id. 
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allege and prove.169 Therefore, the plaintiff cannot fend off a statute
of limitations defense by arguing that no evidence of scienter ever
arose. The plaintiff must indicate some point in time at which the
plaintiff discovered evidence of scienter.170 
Moreover, defendants control points of contention regarding
scienter as they raise the statute of limitations issue. A defendant
may point to an earlier misrepresentation about the company’s
flagship product and argue that under the “core operations”
inference, the plaintiff should have inferred scienter, thereby
triggering the statute of limitations.171 To keep the limitations
period from running, plaintiffs must concede—assuming they can—
that the misrepresentation did not suggest that the defendant acted
with scienter and thus was not actionable securities fraud. And so
the plaintiffs’ very allegations will be used against them.172
Even still, plaintiffs must point to some evidence that the
defendant acted with scienter or they will not have filed their claim
in good faith. Forcing plaintiffs to point to an “aha! moment” or the
“smoking gun” of fraud will likely set the claim up for ready
dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage for two reasons. First, solitary
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 313 (2007); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
170. See Mia Mazza, The Tactics of Asserting the Statute of Limitations Defense After
Merck v. Reynolds, 6 SEC. LITIG. REP. 1 (2010) (“Whereas Tellabs requires courts to take a
holistic approach to scienter at the initial pleading stage, Merck will require courts to analyze
scienter in a more surgical manner.... [U]nder Merck, courts may be asked to take the
‘collective’ body of facts and start slicing them away one by one ... to determine whether it
was the very first fact that, upon emerging into the eye of the reasonably diligent public
‘indicated’ scienter.”). 
171. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing how defendants may invoke the collective scienter
theory and the “core operations” inference offensively against plaintiffs). 
172. Van Cleave, supra note 53, at 88 (“This story very likely starts with the standard
assertions that, prior to the fraudulent transaction, the defendants intentionally and
knowingly made the untrue statements or failed to state the required material facts. If the
complaint is not filed within [two years] of any of these startling allegations, the plaintiff’s
detailed account of the fraud enables the defendant to plead expiration of the [two-year]
statute of limitations. The blatancy of the plaintiff’s allegations may be used against him as
the very facts which alerted him to the fraud.”); cf. Mazza, supra note 170, at 1 (noting that
the converse is true for defendants but neglecting that plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden
of proof, stating “[a]lthough parties are permitted to make ‘alternative’ or ‘inconsistent’
arguments under Rule 8(d)(3), there is nevertheless a real tension between arguing (i) that
plaintiffs fall short of meeting the Reform Act’s stringent standard for pleading scienter, and
(ii) that ‘facts indicating scienter available to the reasonably diligent public more than two
years before the complaint was filed” and noting that “combining both arguments in one
motion may serve to undermine one or both of these points”). 
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events as evidence of the defendant’s mental state often prove
unsuccessful. To illustrate, one of the more common ways plaintiffs
attempt to allege scienter is to allege that the defendants had
“motive and opportunity”—for example, that the defendants made
misrepresentations to sell their own shares at a profit and that this
trading pattern was suspicious or unusually out of line with prior
trading practices.173 But the Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. stated that courts must consider all the
facts taken collectively—not whether any individual allegation,
scrutinized in isolation, evidences scienter.174 Thus, courts such as
the Third Circuit, which had previously allowed a plaintiff to plead
scienter by alleging that the defendant had “motive and opportu-
nity” to commit stock fraud, have since rejected this approach.175
Rather, scienter is a conclusion dependent on a variety of factors,
including (1) the materiality and scale of the fraud; (2) whether the
allegations involve violations of generally accepted accounting
principles176 or the company’s own accounting policies; (3) whether
173. See, e.g., ECA, Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co.,
553 F.3d 187, 198-99 (2d Cir. 2009); Cornelia I. Crowell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc., 519
F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2008); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 277
(3d Cir. 2006); In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 390 (4th Cir. 2005); Novak
v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2000). The renowned plaintiffs’ lawyer William S.
Lerach, responsible for several major securities fraud victories over corporate giants such as
WorldCom and Enron, considers insider selling to be “footprints in the snow” of the culpable.
PATRICK DILLON & CARL M. CANNON, CIRCLE OF GREED: THE SPECTACULAR RISE AND FALL OF
THE LAWYER WHO BROUGHT CORPORATE AMERICA TO ITS KNEES 3 (2010). 
174. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323-24 (“The inference that the defendant acted with scienter
need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the smoking-gun genre, or even the most plausible of
competing inferences.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Zucco Partners, L.L.C.
v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e recognize that Tellabs calls into
question a methodology that relies exclusively on a segmented analysis of scienter.”). 
175. Inst. Invs. Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 (3d Cir. 2009) (“While it is true
that motive can be a relevant consideration, and personal financial gain may weigh heavily
in favor of a scienter inference, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that the absence of a
motive allegation is not fatal. As earlier stated, allegations must be considered collectively;
the significance that can be ascribed to an allegation of motive, or lack thereof, depends on
the entirety of the complaint. If the significance of the presence, or absence, of motive
allegations can be ascertained only by reference to the complete complaint, then a general
rule that motive allegations are sufficient—or necessary—is unsound.”) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). 
176. “Promulgated by the accounting profession’s Financial Accounting Standards Board,
‘generally accepted accounting principles’ are the conventions, rules, and procedures that
define accepted accounting practices.” United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805,
811 n.7 (1984). 
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the SEC or some other party brought an action alleging the same
fraudulent conduct; and (4) whether the defendant had ready access
to information that would show that the public statements were not
accurate.177 If plaintiffs cabin their scienter allegations, they will
lack the ability to paint the compelling mosaic necessary to show
the defendant’s fraudulent intent. 
Second, securities fraud plaintiffs must allege why each misstate-
ment would have been false or misleading at the time the plaintiffs
allege that the misstatement was made.178 Merely alleging that
defendants made misstatements and then showing in hindsight
that they were false does not satisfy the PSLRA’s particularity
requirement.179 This concept is commonly referred to as the general
prohibition against pleading “fraud by hindsight.”180 Plaintiffs must
have “specific allegations showing that the [d]efendants either knew
of or recklessly disregarded the falsity of their own statements at
the time the statements were made.”181 Without these specific alle-
gations, the fact that the defendants’ statements later turned out
to be false is irrelevant, and courts will refuse to find scienter
because it would be the equivalent of finding fraud by hindsight.182
177. Schleicher v. Wendt, 529 F. Supp. 2d 959, 971-72 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (collecting cases);
see also Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (naming nine factors as
suggestive of scienter: (1) insider trading at a suspicious time or in an unusual amount; (2)
divergence between internal reports and external statements on the same subject; (3)
closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure
of inconsistent information; (4) evidence of bribery; (5) ancillary lawsuits charging fraud and
the company’s quick settlement of that suit; (6) disregard of the most current factual
information; (7) disclosure of accounting information in a way that its negative implications
could only be understood by one with a high degree of sophistication; (8) personal interest of
certain directors in not informing disinterested directors of an impending sale of stock; and
(9) self-interested motivation of defendants in saving their salaries or jobs). 
178. Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 2008); In re Cerner Corp. Sec. Litig., 425
F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2005); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627-28 (7th Cir.
1990).
179. Elam, 544 F.3d at 927; In re Cerner Corp., 425 F.3d at 1083.
180. See Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities
Litigators Need To Know, 62 BUS. LAW. 1281, 1321 (2007). The fraud-by-hindsight doctrine
has been criticized as a thinly veiled attempt by courts to screen securities cases early, rather
than an effort to control the hindsight bias in securities litigation. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud
by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 776-77 (2004). 
181. Konkol v. Diebold, Inc., 590 F.3d 390, 403 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007) (stating that requiring
plaintiffs to plead a strong inference of scienter prevents pleading fraud by hindsight). 
182. See, e.g., Konkol, 590 F.3d at 403; Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 694-95 (7th Cir.
2008); Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2007); see also
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Forcing plaintiffs to admit that earlier misrepresentations were not
made with the requisite scienter may cause plaintiffs to fall
dangerously close to alleging fraud by hindsight.183 
When a defendant raises the statute of limitations defense, it is
a lose-lose situation for plaintiffs: either defeat the statute of limi-
tations defense by conceding that previous events did not establish
the defendant’s culpable state of mind and thus expose the case to
ready dismissal; or lose on the statute of limitations defense and be
forever barred from suit.184 Further, if the plaintiffs file their
complaint before the date of the event that they claim provided
sufficient evidence of scienter, they risk Rule 11 sanctions. When
Congress enacted the PSLRA, it also enacted a heightened Rule 11
provision that required courts to issue findings that the attorneys
and parties complied with Rule 11’s requirement that the allega-
tions contained existing evidentiary support.185 If plaintiffs defend
against the statute of limitations and argue that certain facts did
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is a big
difference between knowing about the reports from [a subsidiary] and knowing that the
reports are false. The complaint documents the former but not the latter.”). 
183. See Inst. Invs. Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 269 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that
the plaintiffs did not allege fraud by hindsight because, in judging the totality of
circumstances and allegations, the court concluded there was a strong inference of scienter). 
184. In Merck this problem was apparent at oral argument. The plaintiffs maintained that
the statements made by Merck concerning the naproxen hypothesis did not show scienter
because the defendants never disclosed that the hypothesis was not tested, and thus they
could not have discovered facts constituting scienter before the statute of limitations had run.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 167, at 36 (statement of David C. Frederick, Esq.).
Justice Kennedy observed at argument, “[even if the Court adopts] your theory of the case,
there is some problem with the allegation that there was fraud ... because Merck did not
disclose that the hypothesis was only hypothetical, and the FDA August letter made that
clear.” Id. at 42. 
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1)-(2) (2006). Congress enacted this provision as part of its
objective in the PSLRA to reduce “frivolous” suits. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 7, 14 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686, 693. Recent decisions from the federal appellate
courts suggest federal district courts should apply this provision with a renewed vigor. See,
e.g., Ledford v. Peeples, 605 F.3d 871, 928 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing district court’s decision
that failed to impose Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff’s counsel); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 579 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2009) (encouraging parties to move for Rule 11
sanctions and suggesting that failure to do so would result in lesser award of fees); Citibank
Global Mkts., Inc. v. Rodriguez Santana, 573 F.3d 17, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2009) (suggesting that
Rule 11 findings are required even if a “claim was made under the securities laws but where
all claims were dismissed on state law grounds”); see also Cohen v. USEC, Inc., 70 F. App’x
679, 689 (4th Cir. 2003) (remanding the case to the district court to make required Rule 11
findings); Gurary v. Nu-Tech Bio-Med, Inc., 303 F.3d 212, 222-26 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). 
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not give rise to actionable securities fraud even though they had
filed suit at the time those events occurred, sanctions would be
appropriate. Consider the exchange that took place at oral argu-
ment in Merck between plaintiffs’ counsel and the Justices. Counsel
suggested that the plaintiffs first found sufficient evidence of
scienter in 2004 when the Wall Street Journal published internal
e-mails from Merck executives stating that they wanted to keep the
side effects of Vioxx secret to enhance the drug’s profitability.186 But
the plaintiffs filed their complaint in 2003, before this article was
published.187 Justice Sotomayor then questioned, “[s]o you are
admitting that you filed an improper complaint, that you didn’t
have a ... good faith basis for the complaint you filed?”188
As shown, Merck contains several pleading pitfalls for plaintiff-
investors. Artful pleading will become paramount in cases involving
the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs must be careful to retain the
allegations that are necessary to make a “cogent and ... compelling”
case that the defendant-company acted with scienter,189 avoid fraud
by hindsight and sanctions, and defeat the statute of limitations. 
3. Failing To Achieve Uniformity in the Statute of Limitations
Another detriment of Merck is that it fails to achieve the much
sought-after uniformity in the statute of limitations for securities
fraud. In Lampf, the Supreme Court adopted a uniform statute of
limitations, concluding that “the federal interests in predictability
and judicial economy counsel[ed]” in favor of a uniform rule in the
186. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 167, at 33.
187. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1790 (2010).
188. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 167, at 33; see also DeBruyne v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc’y, 920 F.2d 457, 466 n.19 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Plaintiffs have also suggested
that they have complied with the statute of limitations because at least a portion of their
knowledge regarding the alleged misrepresentations did not arise until after they filed the
complaint and hired their expert .... It is an intellectually bankrupt argument, however, or
a violation of rule 11, for a plaintiff to file a complaint alleging misrepresentation and, in the
same breath, to assert that he or she did not discover the misrepresentation until after the
filing of the complaint.”). 
189. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (“An inference
of fraudulent intent may be plausible, yet less cogent than other, nonculpable explanations
for the defendant's conduct. To qualify as ‘strong’ within the intendment of § 21D(b)(2), we
hold, an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”). 
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context of claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.190 Merck
ended the divide over what “discovery” means and what “facts con-
stitut[e] the violation,”191 but substituted one circuit split for
another by incorporating scienter.192 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently dodged the question of what scienter means,193 and the
federal appellate courts have been far from uniform in their
approach.194 Now, plaintiffs seeking to avoid the statute of limita-
tions defense may seek out those circuits with stringent scienter
standards so they may successfully argue that they did not have
notice of that claim.
In sum, Merck is plaintiff friendly insofar as it could have been
worse for plaintiff-investors. Merck still presents substantial
obstacles for plaintiffs in overcoming the statute of limitations
defense. But what then is the answer? What could the Court have
done? Part III.B argues that the remedy lies in abolishing the
statute of limitations. 
B. The Illusory Benefits to a Discovery Provision
The statute of limitations and its statute of repose involve a
delicate balance: “too much emphasis on the statute of limitations
can precipitate premature and groundless suits, as plaintiffs rush
to beat the deadline without being able to obtain good evidence of
fraud; and the ... statute of repose gives defendants a definite limit
190. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357 (1991). 
191. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1789-90.
192. Id. at 1796. 
193. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319 n.3; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12
(1976). 
194. See Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 594 F.3d 783, 790-91
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that scienter requires deliberate recklessness or actual knowledge,
and motive and opportunity alone are never sufficient); In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50
F.3d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1994)  (same); see also  Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v.
BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 181, 199 (4th Cir. 2009) (asserting that motive and
opportunity are useful factors, but not themselves necessary or sufficient); Frank v. Dana
Corp., 547 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Trust Fund
IBEW v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 2008) (same); ACA Fin. Guar. Corp.
v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (same); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs,
Inc. (Tellabs I), 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340
F.3d 1083, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000)
(motive and opportunity alone are sufficient to establish scienter); In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999) (same).
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beyond which they needn’t fear being sued.”195 But too little empha-
sis would enable investors to wait to see whether a poorly per-
formed stock recovered, reap investment profits if it did, and sue for
damages if it did not.196 This mantra has sustained the statute of
limitations for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. When its discovery
provision is scrutinized, however, its usefulness is questionable. As
this Part shows, the practical realities of securities fraud litigation
already encourage prompt filing and the securities laws already
contain many more effective features that deter dilatory conduct by
plaintiffs.197 Moreover, securities fraud is complex and difficult to
discover. It is more likely that plaintiff-investors did not know
about the fraud, rather than that they sat on the information and
refrained from filing suit.198 Further, this Part demonstrates that
the statute of limitations imposes an empty procedural cost on
parties and the judicial system.199 
1. The Practical Realities of Securities Litigation and Prompt
Filing
An essential feature of any statute of limitations that accrues
upon discovery is that it encourages the prompt filing of a law-
suit.200 Prompt filing achieves several laudable goals. First, prompt
filing enhances the accuracy of evidence because evidence deterio-
rates over time.201 Second, prompt filing monitors the plaintiff ’s
195. Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1997). 
196. See, e.g., Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting from the denial to rehear the case en banc), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2400 (2010);
New Eng. Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 336 F.3d 495, 499
(6th Cir. 2003); Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1993)
(referring to this as a “[h]eads I win, tails you lose” situation). 
197. See infra Part III.B.1.
198. See infra Part III.B.2.
199. See infra Part III.B.3.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971); Order of United
Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 n.20 (1947); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry.
Co. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913). 
201. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 378
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because
of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost.”) (quoting
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)); Betz, 519 F.3d at 868 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from the denial to rehear the case en banc) (“[P]laintiff’s delay may prejudice defendant’s
case as memories fade, documents are lost, and witnesses become unavailable.”) (quoting
2011] TOWARD A JUST MEASURE OF REPOSE 1589
conduct by “making it harder ... to file claims based on evidence
whose accuracy cannot be checked.”202 Third, prompt filing deters
defendant misconduct by enforcing the substantive law.203 The
private rights of action under the securities laws supplement the
enforcement powers of the SEC and DOJ.204 These private attorneys
general threaten defendants into compliance with the securities
laws, and their legitimacy is bolstered by their deterrent effect.205
“Given that plaintiffs are often relied on as private attorneys
general to enforce substantive rights, a policy requiring plaintiffs
to file quickly enhances deterrence objectives.”206 
But a statute of limitations that accrues upon discovery is
unnecessary to achieve these goals. As observed by the faculty at
law and business schools as amici curiae in Merck, plaintiff-
investors already have incentives to investigate immediately the
possibility of fraud, regardless of the length of the statute of
limitations or when the time limit is triggered.207 In fact, when
Congress enacted the PSLRA, it was concerned that plaintiffs had
too much incentive to race to court.208 Several features of securities
litigation motivate plaintiffs to file early. First, the presence of
institutional investors as lead plaintiffs, which has increased under
the PSLRA,209 encourages plaintiffs to investigate and file because
Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1993)); Eriline Co. v. Johnson,
440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (“A statute of limitations defense, by contrast, primarily
serves only defendants by preventing the revival of stale claims in which the defense is
hampered by lost evidence, faded memories, and disappearing witnesses, and to avoid unfair
surprise.”) (quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 473 (1975)). 
202. Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 77 (2005). 
203. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 492-93.
204. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
205. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (2006) (“Deterrence ... is the only
rationale that can justify the significant costs—both public and private—that securities class
actions impose on investors and the judiciary.”). 
206. Malveaux, supra note 202, at 78; see Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 492; see also
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868) (“The policy of these
statutes is to encourage promptitude in the prosecution of remedies.”). 
207. Brief of Amici Curiae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of
Respondents, supra note 128, at 31-33.
208. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731; S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006); see also Andrew S. Gold, Experimenting with the
Lead Plaintiff Selection Process in Securities Class Actions: A Suggestion for PSLRA Reform,
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these institutional investors often have sufficient resources to
conduct their own prefiling investigation.210 If a firm delays its
investigation, it may miss a chance to serve as lead counsel.211 And
the frequency of participation by institutional investors as lead
plaintiff has been increasing.212 In 2009, institutional investors
served as lead plaintiff in 65 percent of the securities fraud class
actions that settled—the highest proportion to date.213 Also, by
employing constructive discovery, the Court further reduced the
risk of plaintiff inactivity—the clock begins when a reasonable
investor would have discovered the fraud.214 
Second, filing early correlates with a stronger likelihood of
surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Historically, securities
fraud class actions that have longer filing lags are dismissed at a
higher rate than class actions with shorter filing lags.215 For
example, 
57 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 450-51 (2008); Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary
Duties of Institutional Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1393 (2001).
210. Brief of Amici Curiae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of
Respondents, supra note 128, at 32; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B). Congress intended
to encourage the use of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs to control the plaintiffs’
attorney. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33; S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11; see also Elliot J. Weiss &
John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2095 (1995) (noting that
large institutions did not, until recently, elect to take monitoring roles in private securities
class action cases despite having substantial interest in the outcome).
211. Brief of Amici Curiae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of
Respondents, supra note 128, at 33; Ralph V. De Martino & Jennifer H. Unhoch, U.S.
Supreme Court Addresses the Statute of Limitations for Private Federal Securities Fraud
Claims 3 (May 24, 2010), http://www.cozen.com/admin/files/publications/sec052110.pdf (“Most
jurisdictions recognize the ‘first to file’ rule when granting class certifications. Plaintiffs’
counsel who are the first to file class action complaints tend to be granted the position of lead
counsel which allows them to manage the litigation and, therefore, garner the lion’s share
of any attorneys fees awarded in connection with a judgment or settlement. The authors
believe that the incentive to be the ‘first to file’ will mitigate any concerns regarding plaintiffs
unduly delaying commencement of a class action lawsuit.”). 
212. ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 10 (2009), available at http://securities.
stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2009/Settlements_Through_12_2009.pdf. 
213. Id.
214. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010). Moreover, for public
information, “plaintiffs are presumed to have read prospectuses, quarterly reports, and other
information relating to their investments.” Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp.,
554 F.3d 342, 347 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d
239, 252 (3d Cir. 2001)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
215. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 134, at 8. 
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[b]etween 1996 and 2006, 55 percent of the filings with a lag of
more than a year have been dismissed, compared to 42 percent
dismissal rate for filings with a lag between one year and six
months and 36 percent for filings with a lag of less than six
months.216
Third, any delay comes at the cost of fading memories, lost
documents, and unavailable witnesses to both defendants and
plaintiffs.217 What is worse still, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary noted in its report on SOX that “it only takes a few
seconds to warm up the shredder,” and any delay invites defendants
to take steps to conceal their deceit.218 Plaintiffs have the burden of
satisfying the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA—that
they allege all facts with particularity and a strong inference of
scienter.219 Plaintiffs who delay may find themselves without the
time needed to satisfy these rigorous demands.220 Moreover,
securities fraud cases are so complex that an expert and a regres-
sion analysis of the stock price’s reaction are indispensable tools to
prosecuting a securities case, so much so that these tools have
become intertwined with the substantive law of securities fraud
216. Id.
217. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 480 (“Except in special circumstances (such as
when a plaintiff relies on an alleged agreement with the defendant), there is no reason to
assume that the evidence favorable to the defendant will deteriorate more rapidly than the
evidence favorable to the plaintiff.”). 
218. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 9 (2002).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006); see also Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 486
(“[B]ecause the plaintiff usually bears the burden of proof on the majority of issues, ... on
balance, deterioration of evidence would hurt the plaintiff more than it would hurt the
defendant.”). 
220. Brief of Amici Curiae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of
Respondents, supra note 128, at 32; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (“In any private action
arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof
that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect
to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”); J.
Robert Brown, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Mission to Restrict Investor Protection:
Merck v. Reynolds (Part 7: The Misguided Notion of Inquiry Notice) (June 23, 2009),
http://www. theracetothebottom.org/securities-Issues/the-supreme-court-and-the-mission-to-
restrict-investor-prote-8.html (“The two year period ... was designed to provide adequate time
to put together a complex case once the facts had become apparent. The discovery of facts
supporting fraud didn’t necessarily mean that plaintiffs were finished. They still had to
determine who was responsible and to put together an adequate case.”). 
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itself.221 Marshaling this evidence takes time, and plaintiffs are not
likely to file first and amend later, which is a risky strategy
especially given that the liberal amendment policy seems curtailed
in securities litigation.222 
Two final points: failure to meet the statute of limitations is
likely to be malpractice in many situations,223 and under our pro-
posal, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases still retain a statute of
repose to encourage investors to investigate immediately.224 A
statute of repose limits defendants’ liability by limiting the time
during which a cause of action can arise.225 The Supreme Court in
Merck pointed specifically to the statute of repose to alleviate
defendants’ fears that a lax statute of limitations would give rise to
stale claims or subject them to liability for acts taken long ago.226
Not only are there sufficient mechanisms to encourage early
filing, but the securities laws and the practical realities of securities
litigation also contain many safeguards that prevent fraud by
the plaintiffs’ attorneys. First, the PSLRA mandated that dis-
trict courts determine whether the attorneys complied with Rule
11’s requirements.227 Second, the PSLRA’s heightened pleading
221. MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, EXPERT WITNESSES: SECURITIES CASES § 10:1 (2009); Michael
J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STANFORD J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 186 (2009); see also
Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and
Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1270 (stating that securities class actions
typically are more factually and legally complex than individual litigant cases and
prosecution of these claims requires greater investments of time and greater outlays of
pretrial expenses).
222. Cf. Mazza, supra note 170, at 1 (arguing for more curtailment of the amendment
policy in securities litigation). See generally Anthony Michael Sabino, The New Uniform
Statute of Limitations for Federal Securities Fraud Actions: Its Evolution, Its Impact, and a
Call for Reform, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 520-21 (1992); John M. Wunderlich, Amending
Pleadings in Securities Fraud Litigation After Tellabs, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 361 (2009). 
223. 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 23.3 (2007);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 617. 
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
225. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 620. Statutes of repose are premised on the idea “that
a time should arrive when a person is no longer responsible for a past act.” Id. 
226. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (2010) (“Merck fears that [requiring
that plaintiffs discover scienter to trigger the statute of limitations] will give life to stale
claims or subject defendants to liability for acts taken long ago. But Congress’ inclusion in
the statute of an unqualified bar on actions instituted 5 years after such violation ... giving
defendants total repose after five years, should diminish that fear.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). 
227. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1)-(2) (stating that at the close of adjudication, “the court
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standard forces plaintiffs to tip their hand and show what evidence
they have to establish a claim.228 Last, attorneys intuitively seek
to avoid the reputation costs that result from fabricating alle-
gations.229 Reputation influences behavior,230 and in securities
litigation, a highly specialized practice area,231 an attorney who
shall include in the record specific findings regarding compliance by each party ... with each
requirement of Rule 11(b),” and that if the court makes a finding “that a party ... violated any
requirement of Rule 11(b), ... the court shall impose sanctions on such party”); FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(b) (requiring that attorneys’ filings have a proper purpose, be warranted by law, and
be based on evidentiary support after a reasonable inquiry); see also Marks v. CDW
Computer Ctrs., Inc., 122 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 1997) (“What facts, sufficiently particular
to file a claim, could [the plaintiff] have found even if he had started looking at that time?
How could he have confirmed or dispelled any suspicions with the materials available to him?
Would [the defendant] have had [the plaintiff] risk Rule 11 sanctions or a violation of Rule
9(b) by filing a complaint listing the ‘bad blood’ or ‘storm warnings’ and no other
particularized evidence of fraud?”). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also require
that a lawyer not bring any proceeding unless there is a basis in fact for doing so. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010). A lawyer must also be candid with the court and
refrain from offering evidence that the lawyer knows is false. Id. R. 3.3(a)(1). Moreover, in
the event counsel later discovers that this evidence is false, counsel must take certain
remedial measures, which may include disclosure to the court if necessary. Id.
228. See John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing
Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 622-23 (2008) (discussing how Congress enacted the PSLRA’s
heightened pleading provision to curb in terrorem settlements and abusive practices by
plaintiffs’ attorneys). 
229. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 220-21, 250-51 (2004) (discussing the role of reputation in
contingency fee practice such as large class actions); Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation
on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 180 (2009) (observing that “adversaries
will respond differently to settlement offers and statements made in negotiations, depending
on their opponents’ reputations for candor and taking reasonable positions”); see also Scott
R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal
Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 485 (2005)
(analyzing a potential “reputational solution” to a bargaining problem that would enable
parties to signal their willingness to cooperate by hiring an attorney with a reputation for
collaboration); Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics
2000 To Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption and
State Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207, 270 n.269 (2001) (arguing that a lawyer’s reputation
for truthfulness and fairness increases that lawyer’s effectiveness as a negotiator in future
negotiations).
230. Corporations recognize the intrinsic value of reputation as evidenced from the
presence of in-house public relations departments. Pub. Relations Consultants Ass’n,
http://www.prca.org.uk/Whatispr (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (“Public relations is all about
reputation.”).
231. See, e.g., Posting of Mae Kuykendall to The Conglomerate, http://www.the
conglomerate.org/2010/04/corporate-and-securities-anomalies-fictions-and-inconvenient-
truths-.html (Apr. 12, 2010); Kevin LaCroix, The Future of the Plaintiffs’ Securities Bar?,
The D&O Diary (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/11/articles/plaintiffs-
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fabricates allegations would develop a reputation for dishonesty
among other attorneys, institutional investors and other potential
plaintiffs, and the courts, all of which makes future representation
difficult.232 Moreover, a consequence of a practice area with highly
sophisticated attorneys representing victims in a discovery rule
jurisdiction is that lawyers promptly file, knowing that the safest
course of action is to file suit as soon as possible.233
2. The Discovery of Merited Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Claims
The discovery provision in the statute of limitations purports to
penalize securities fraud plaintiffs who sit on their rights and wait
to file suit.234 But this justification assumes that plaintiff-investors
were aware of the fraud and their attorneys intentionally waited to
file suit. This assumption is misguided. It is more likely that
plaintiffs did not know about the fraud, rather than that they sat
on their hands with the information.235 
bar/the-future-of-the-plaintiffs-securities-bar. After the PSLRA, smaller plaintiffs’ firms left
the private class action arena. Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner’s View of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 285 (1997). 
232. KRITZER, supra note 229, at 220 (discussing the role of reputation in contingency fee
practice such as large class actions).
233. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances
Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 984-85 (1988) (“One consequence of a sophisticated bar that
represents substantial numbers of victims in discovery rule jurisdictions is that lawyers
run—rather than walk—directly to the courthouse with any client who manifests the
slightest indication of insidious disease. Regardless of whether the client has suffered any
disability or pecuniary loss, the attorney knows the safest course of action is filing a suit as
promptly as possible.”).
234. E.g., Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting from the denial to rehear the case en banc), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2400 (2010);
New Eng. Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 336 F.3d 495,
499-500 (6th Cir. 2003); Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1334 (7th Cir. 1997);
Nerman v. Alexander Grant & Co., 926 F.2d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Perhaps it was
reasonable for the plaintiffs to take a ‘wait and see’ approach. But that election did not toll
the statute of limitations. That is precisely the point of the statute of limitations: the
plaintiffs had five years to ‘wait and see,’ and to decide whether to sue for fraud or live with
the less-than-promised deal.”).
235. See Malveaux, supra note 202, at 118 (“Statutes of limitations are also a poor
deterrent of plaintiff misconduct where the plaintiff is unaware of her potential claim.”).
People are often prone to the “planning fallacy”—a systemic tendency toward unrealistic
optimism about the time it takes to complete projects. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 7 (2008);
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First, securities fraud, by its nature, is secretive; it is conceal-
ment of the truth.236 Justice Kennedy observed in Lampf that 
[t]he real burden on most investors ... is the initial matter of
discovering whether a violation of the securities laws occurred
at all. This is particularly the case for victims of the classic
fraud-like case that often arises under § 10(b).... The most
extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within the
time allowed for bringing an express cause of action under the
1934 Act.237 
Enron’s fraud, for example, announced in 2001, traced back to
1997.238 And securities fraud is often uncovered through an un-
conventional investigation or happenstance. The financial crisis
exposed Bernard Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme.239 Also, a recent
study found that securities fraud is uncovered by employees,
nonfinancial-market regulators, and the media more often than
traditional watchdogs such as the SEC, auditors, analysts, or bond
or equity holders.240 This outcome is somewhat expected because
Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitations, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 607, 621 (2008). This fallacy is more pronounced for longer tasks than shorter ones,
such as preparing a complicated lawsuit. This fallacy suggests that plaintiffs will
underestimate the duration of the task of filing a lawsuit, misschedule their time, and miss
the deadline. Wistrich, supra at 625-26. 
236. One needs only to consult the laundry list of different types of fraud to see the myriad
ways defrauders deceive the investing public. See generally M. Owen Donley III, A (Very
Brief) Encyclopedia of Securities Fraud, 16 BUS. L. TODAY 35 (2007). 
237. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 377 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
238. Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) (statement of Sen. Paul
Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). 
239. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION 221-22 (2009) (“The receding stock market tide exposed Bernard Madoff,
who is said to have confessed to having pulled off the biggest Ponzi scheme in history. The
scheme would have lasted longer and the losses to investors would have been greater had the
stock market crash been postponed. The crash reduced the value of Madoff’s hedge fund, but
more important (because the fund probably had little in the way of assets), the general
economic collapse caused requests for redemptions of investments in hedge funds and other
investment funds to soar, and Madoff could not honor his investors’ requests for redemption
and as a result his scheme collapsed.”). 
240. See generally Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
(Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=891482.
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increasing investment options and an increased holding of diversi-
fied portfolios has made sifting through the incredible amount of
information companies pour out daily difficult.241 
Second, meritorious securities fraud claims still must allege a
“strong inference” of scienter with sufficient particularity,242 and
crafting this kind of allegation takes time. Discovery of scienter is
particularly difficult because the standard for determining scienter
is less than clear.243 Scholars disagree whether a corporation is a
collective of persons, whose mental state can be inferred from those
persons,244 or whether the corporation has an independent existence
and culture separate from its individual employees with a state of
241. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors in Support of
Respondents at 7, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010) (No. 08-905), 2009 WL
3477292 (“Companies introduce numerous types of information into the marketplace on a
daily basis. Each company alone may make more than ten filings per year with the SEC, not
counting restatements. Additionally, companies regularly file press releases, maintain
websites containing company information, news, and events, and, in the case of
pharmaceutical companies, conduct studies regarding their existing products, as well as
those still in development, and release reports of the results.”). 
242. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006).
243. The Ninth Circuit aptly explained the problem:
The PSLRA requires a plaintiff to plead a complaint of securities fraud with an
unprecedented degree of specificity and detail “giving rise to a strong inference
of deliberate recklessness.” This is not an easy standard to comply with—it was
not intended to be—and plaintiffs must be held to it. But how much detail is
enough detail? When is an inference of deliberate recklessness sufficiently
strong? There is no bright-line rule. Sometimes it is easy to tell, but often it is
not. The acid test is a motion to dismiss. We need to bear in mind that we are
not operating in the world of notice pleadings. In this technical and demanding
corner of the law, the drafting of a cognizable complaint can be a matter of trial
and error.
Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(internal citations omitted). Also, consider the questions posed by Professors Abril and
Olazábal: 
Does [corporate scienter] reside in the mind of the ... CEO? In the mind of the
chief financial officer who prepared the report ...? In the minds of the regional
sales managers, some of whom falsified numbers included in the fraudulent
report? In the minds of the hundreds of rank and file employees who bought
into the aggressive culture of meeting Wall Street’s financial performance
targets at any and all costs?
Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 81, 83; see also Mauro, supra note 144 (quoting David Frederick of Kellogg,
Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, who argued and won the case for Merck shareholders,
as stating that Merck is especially significant because scienter is “usually the hardest part
of the securities fraud to find out about”).
244. Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability, 6 CRIM. L.F. 1, 1-2 (1995). 
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mind all its own.245 At the individual level, “because of [the] limi-
tations on mind reading,” state of mind must be inferred from
conduct rather than determined directly.246 The federal appellate
courts have adopted different tests to allege scienter, adding further
confusion to the mix.247 Tellabs held that a “strong inference” of
scienter depends on a balancing of both culpable and nonculpable
inferences of scienter—a weighing of competing probabilities.248
There is no clear test for scienter; the outcome of this weighing is
subject to the district judge.249
Further, the PSLRA requires that all allegations be alleged
“with particularity,”250 without the benefit of discovery.251 Professor
Charles W. Murdock highlights four ways plaintiff-investors can
acquire information this detailed: 
(1) the board of directors commissions a special study ... (2) the
company goes into bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court orders
a special study; (3) the accountants decide to restate the com-
pany’s financials; or (4) the plaintiff locates an informant from
within the company who has knowledge of the relevant facts.252
245. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 243, at 104-05.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 608 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2010). 
247. Compare Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
securities fraud plaintiffs may allege a “strong inference” of scienter by alleging either: (1)
facts to show the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (2) facts
that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness),
with In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that
securities fraud plaintiffs may allege a “strong inference” of scienter by alleging actual
knowledge or recklessness), and Tellabs I, 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that
courts engage in a holistic evaluation to determine whether securities fraud plaintiffs alleged
a “strong inference” of scienter).
248. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323-24 (2007) (“The
strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum. The inquiry is inherently
comparative: How likely is it that one conclusion as compared to others, follows from the
underlying facts? To determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that give rise to the
requisite ‘strong inference’ of scienter, a court must consider plausible, nonculpable
explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.”).
249. See Allan Horwich & Sean Siekkinen, Pleading Reform or Unconstitutional
Encroachment? An Analysis of the Seventh Amendment Implications of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 35 SEC. REG. L.J. 4, 7 (2007); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to
Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1890 (2008). 
250. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006).
251. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(b).
252. Murdock, supra note 94, at 831-32; see also Richard Casey & Jared Fields,
Piggybacking Through the Pleading Standards: Reliance on Third-Party Investigative
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But each path proves difficult for plaintiffs. First, both the board of
directors—even when comprised of “independent” directors—and
the company’s auditors and analysts are uniquely susceptible to
capture,253 and they are often likewise named as defendants in the
securities fraud complaint.254 Second, although materials prepared
in the context of a company’s bankruptcy—for example, reports by
the bankruptcy examiner, depositions, or other discovery—may
provide a wealth of detailed information, courts refuse to grant
plaintiffs access to this information because it would circumvent
the PSLRA’s discovery stay and turn bankruptcy materials into
tools that fuel litigation.255 And if the bankruptcy case is handled
Materials To Satisfy Particularity Requirements in Securities Class Actions, 7 SEC. LITIG.
REP. 11 (2010) (discussing how securities fraud plaintiffs use information disclosed in federal
enforcement actions, bankruptcy examiner reports, confidential sources, or other public
sources to plead sufficient facts). 
253. See MACEY, supra note 71, at 64 (“[I]t is virtually impossible to identify, much less to
monitor and control, the myriad ways that board independence can be compromised.”); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403,
1418 (2002) (“[T]he audit firm always knew that the individual audit partner serving the
large client could become conflicted because the audit partner’s job depended on satisfying
its single client; but, the audit firm also knew that it could monitor its individual audit
partners to manage this conflict. For a long time, monitoring seemingly worked—at least
passably well. More recently, incentive-based compensation has exacerbated the monitoring
problem, and similarly the evolution of the auditing firm into a financial conglomerate has
seriously compromised old systems of internal control.”); George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential
Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 143-
44 (2010) (“CEOs always influence, and often dominate, the selection of outside directors....
CEOs also control the information received by outside directors. The CEO can curry their
favor in various ways and can threaten to remove uncooperative members. The CEO (who
is almost always a director) and her allies on the board can seize the board's initiative, and
‘groupthink’ discourages anyone inclined to oppose them. Further efforts to ensure board
independence are probably doomed to failure because of the boards’ ‘unique susceptibility to
capture by the managers they are supposed to monitor.’”); Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale,
Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the
Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2003) (“[T]he balance of power between
accounting firms and their clients has shifted dangerously away from the equilibrium
imbedded in the market model and back in the direction of the companies the accounting
firms are supposed to monitor. This change threatens to undermine the investing public’s
basic faith in the quality of financial reporting. If investors think that there is a risk the
books do not reflect the nature of the companies’ businesses and the risks associated with the
investment, they will not invest in companies.”).
254. Parties not employed by the issuing firm are commonly referred to in securities fraud
cases as “secondary actors,” which included the company’s lawyers, accountants, and
auditors, among others. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown L.L.P., 603 F.3d 144, 148 n.1
(2d Cir. 2010). 
255. See John M. Wunderlich, Bankruptcy’s Protection for Non-Debtors From Securities
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poorly, as it was for Enron, plaintiffs may not be able to wait for a
bankruptcy examiner’s report.256 Third, the publication of a finan-
cial restatement, without more, is not enough to create a strong
inference of scienter.257 And fourth, practical difficulties aside,258 the
viability of pleading securities fraud claims with allegations from
confidential informants has been severely undermined since
Tellabs.259
Barring a securities fraud claim premised on the assumption that
the plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the fraud much
earlier belies the realities of securities litigation. Plaintiffs with
even the most merited claim must still “thread the eye of a needle
Fraud Suits, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (forthcoming 2011); see also In re Refco, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 05 Civ. 8626(GEL), 2006 WL 2337212, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006) (denying
securities fraud plaintiffs’ motion to lift stay of discovery to obtain SEC investigation
materials and bankruptcy examiner’s report to amend complaint because plaintiffs had not
shown undue prejudice); In re Recoton, Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(allowing securities fraud plaintiffs access to bankruptcy materials because discovery would
be subject to a protective order “prohibiting its use for any purpose whatsoever other than
in connection with this bankruptcy proceeding and prohibiting its disclosure ... to the
plaintiffs in the [securities class action]”); In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314, 316-17
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (stating that the bankruptcy examiner’s report should not “fuel the
... fires” of further securities litigation).
256. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 151 (2005) (“Enron and the other parties who wished
to sue on Enron’s behalf had only two years in which to file their cases or be barred by the
statute of limitations. Because the case was handled so awkwardly, nearly six months passed
before the examiner was even appointed. The effect was to rush the investigation. The
examiner worked quickly but was still completing his report when the deadline expired. That
left parties who discovered their causes of action through the examiner’s work little or no
time in which to digest the 4,500-page report, retain counsel, and prepare their lawsuits for
filing.”). 
257. See, e.g., Zucco Partners, L.L.C. v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009);
see also In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1202-03 (D.N.M.
2010); Stocke v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1191 (D. Nev. 2009). 
258. Casey & Fields, supra note 252, at 11 (“Few individuals who know the facts relating
to alleged securities fraud are inclined to cooperate with plaintiffs’ attorneys. Moreover,
prospective [confidential witnesses] may be limited by confidentiality agreements or, in the
case of accountants, professional obligations.”).
259. See Jordan Eth & Timothy Blakely, The Use and Abuse of Confidential Witnesses: The
Battle Continues After Tellabs, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2009,
at 607 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1762, 2009); Lyle Roberts,
Pleading in the Dark: The Use (and Potential Abuse) of Confidential Witness Statements in
Federal Securities Fraud Complaints, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE
2009, supra at 153; see also Kaufman & Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy
Regarding Confidential Informants, supra note 157; Kaufman & Wunderlich, Congress, the
Supreme Court, and the Proper Role of Confidential Informants, supra note 157. 
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made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial decree and
congressional action.”260 It takes time to craft a complaint and com-
plete an investigation without discovery that will surpass these
hurdles.
3. The Discovery Provision’s Increased Costs Associated with
Securities Litigation
Another justification for the statute of limitations in general is
that it reduces the volume of litigation.261 Reducing the volume of
frivolous securities litigation has been an imperative of Congress as
of late.262 But the incorporation of the discovery provision actually
thwarts this aim and increases the costs associated with litigating
these already colossal claims.
The statute of limitations does not prevent a securities lawsuit
from being filed; rather it reduces the incentive to do so by pro-
viding defendants with a defense.263 “The effectiveness of this de-
fense in reducing the number of untimely filings depends on the
plaintiff ’s assessment of the futility of pursuing the claim, which in
turn depends on both the certainty and the severity of the sanc-
tion.”264 But Merck’s discovery standard introduces uncertainty with
the application of the statute of limitations. First, Merck has incor-
porated the pliable concept of constructive discovery,265 which
expands the scope of legitimate disagreement over an issue un-
related to the merits, making it less certain that the claim is
barred.266 Additionally, Merck requires that plaintiffs have, or
should have, discovered evidence of scienter,267 which is a highly
contextualized inquiry that is often proved with circumstantial
260. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). 
261. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 495. 
262. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730
(stating that Congress intended to end “the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of
securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer’s stock price,
without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the
discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action”). 
263. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 495. 
264. Id.
265. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010).
266. See Green, supra note 233, at 983. 
267. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796.
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evidence,268 making it even less certain that the claim is barred.269
Second, Merck’s constructive discovery standard just compounds a
problem already existent with sanctions for statute of limitations
in general: although threatened by the loss of the claim to a suc-
cessful statute of limitations defense, Rule 11 sanctions are not
warranted for filing a complaint past the statute of limitations.270
Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense271 that
can be waived if not raised,272 one court has held that a claim filed
after the limitation period has expired cannot be considered a
frivolous claim.273 Sanctions would also be less appropriate in secu-
rities litigation because to conclude that the statute was triggered,
the court must find evidence of securities fraud.274 Thus, a court
would impose Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs where the court
found evidence of securities fraud, which is incoherent. 
“Another consideration is that, given the complexity of existing
limitation rules and the manner in which they have evolved, it has
become increasingly difficult to dispose of time-barred claims as a
threshold or preliminary matter (that is, by demurrer or summary
judgment) rather than at trial.”275 Before Merck, the federal appel-
late courts, using the inquiry-notice standard, readily stated that
268. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983); see also Merck,
130 S. Ct. at 1797 (“Where § 10(b) is at issue, however, the relation of factual falsity and
state of mind is more context specific.”). 
269. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 496 (“[T]he only cost to the plaintiff is the
time, energy and money expended in pursuing a possibly untimely claim. These costs can be
substantial, but if the plaintiff is represented on a contingent fee basis, the financial burden
may be minimal.”). 
270. Rule 11 sanctions here are distinguishable from Rule 11 sanctions discussed in Part
III.A.2, where sanctions would be appropriate if the plaintiff filed a claim without sufficient
evidence of scienter—a necessary element of Rule 10b-5—and thus conceded that he did not
file in good faith. See supra notes 185-94 and accompanying text. But here, Rule 11 sanctions
are not appropriate because the plaintiff would have acted in good faith, but erroneously
predicted how the court would weigh culpable inferences. 
271. E.g., Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d Cir.
2010); Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 494 F.3d 956, 974 (11th Cir. 2007); Johnson v.
Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 781 n.13 (9th Cir. 2007).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Hickey, 580 F.3d 922, 928 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 2115 (2010). 
273. Currie v. Schon, 704 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. La. 1989). 
274. See In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 543 F.3d 150, 172 n.16 (3d Cir.
2008) (commenting on the absurdity of the dissent’s conclusion that there were actionable
misrepresentations that barred litigation).
275. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 496. 
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whether discovery of facts constituting the violation should be
imputed to plaintiffs is a fact-intensive inquiry, typically left for a
jury.276 There is no reason why the constructive discovery standard
set forth in Merck should be any less so: 
The facts constituting such notice must be sufficiently probative
of fraud—sufficiently advanced beyond the stage of a mere
suspicion, sufficiently confirmed or substantiated—not only to
incite the victim to investigate but also to enable him to tie up
any loose ends and complete the investigation in time to file a
timely suit.277
This increases the plaintiffs’ chance of recovery and increases the
time and resources the judiciary must spend to determine the
timeliness of these claims.278 To make matters worse, this determi-
nation expends resources that in no way contribute to merits
resolution—it is a pure procedural cost.279 Merck, though, has
incorporated scienter, which the Supreme Court has encouraged
resolving at the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss stage,280 and this
may encourage courts to resolve this issue when considering
motions to dismiss.
Last, increasing procedural barriers to securities fraud actions
“may contribute to rising securities litigation costs and rising
settlement values.”281 Imposing procedural costs on plaintiffs in
276. E.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam); Tello, 410 F.3d at 977 & n.2; Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 169
(2d Cir. 2005); La Grasta v. First Union Sec. Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 848 (11th Cir. 2004); Young
v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002); Marks v. CDW Computer Ctrs., Inc., 122 F.3d 363,
368-69 (7th Cir. 1997).
277. Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1335 (7th Cir. 1997). 
278. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 496.
279. See Green, supra note 233, at 983-84.
280. District courts have to conduct a mini-trial at the motion to dismiss stage, weighing
inferences for and against the plaintiff, and must resolve whether, on balance, the plaintiffs’
allegations gave rise to scienter. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
322-23 (2007); see also In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728, 746 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
(“The analysis required [by Tellabs], particularly with respect to pleading scienter, is akin
to holding a mini-trial on the merits of the case based only on the complaint. This poses a
great difficulty in resolving a motion to dismiss and letting the case go forward.”). 
281. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of
Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323,
380-81 (2010) [hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Class Certification Merits Trials];
Wunderlich, supra note 228, at 663. 
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response to erroneously perceived abuses—in this case, the misper-
ception that the discovery provision encourages prompt filing,
prevents fraud by plaintiffs, and conserves expenses for defending
time-barred claims—does not stop plaintiffs from bringing suit;
rather plaintiffs compensate for the increased risk of dismissal by
bringing claims with higher damages.282 Discovery costs and other
pre-trial costs then rise to meet the rising level of claimed damages
as these costs are proportional to the size of the claim.283 Therefore,
the statute of limitations, as it is a procedural cost with no corre-
sponding benefit, exacerbates the costs of litigation and settlement
rather than curbs them. 
IV. MARKET FUNCTIONS, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, AND THE CASE
FOR RETAINING REPOSE FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
The bulk of scholarship that focuses on reforming various
statutes of limitations advocates abolishing the limitation period
entirely.284 We agree with the general critique that these scholars
level at statutes of limitations, but securities litigation presents a
unique problem that justifies some measure of repose. Thus, we
argue that a statute of limitations that accrues upon discovery
should be abolished for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, but
repose should be retained. 
As shown by Merck, even a pro-plaintiff interpretation of the
discovery provision in the statute of limitations impedes meritori-
ous cases.285 The cost incurred by the discovery provision comes
with no related benefit. Securities litigants already have significant
incentive to investigate and file promptly.286 The discovery pro-
vision rests on the erroneous assumption that plaintiffs are
sitting on their hands with already discovered claims, but this
282. Kaufman & Wunderlich, Class Certification Merits Trials, supra note 281, at 380-81;
Wunderlich, supra note 228, at 663. 
283. Kaufman & Wunderlich, Class Certification Merits Trials, supra note 281, at 380-81;
Wunderlich, supra note 228, at 663; see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973)
(describing the factors that come into settlement). 
284. See supra Part III.A (discussing various scholars’ approaches to reforming statutes
of limitations). 
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. See supra Part III.B.1.
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ignores the myriad hurdles plaintiffs face in securities litigation
even before discovery.287 Rather, the discovery provision merely
increases procedural costs for the parties and the judicial system.288
Nevertheless, contrary to existing scholarship, securities fraud
needs repose. Part IV.A justifies repose from securities fraud due
to insights from behavioral economics and because of the impact
securities fraud litigation has on the settled economic expectations
of nonculpable economic actors. Part IV.B then addresses the
question that follows from this argument: assuming repose is
justified, what should it look like? 
A. Loss Aversion and Nonculpable Market Participants
Some scholars have advocated for discarding the statute of
limitations and repose completely.289 Other scholars propose
abolishing limitations periods but offer alternatives to extract a
“price” for delayed filing. For example, Judge Wistrich proposes an
“incremental approach” that “penalize[s] plaintiffs for delay in filing
by gradually decreasing the value of their claims.”290 Professors
Ehud Guttel and Michael T. Novick have proposed jettisoning the
all-or-nothing structure of statutes of limitation and instead
“extract[ing] a price that compensates the defendant for his evi-
dentiary loss. This price consists of the total damages claimed by
the plaintiff, discounted by the probabilistic value of the lost
evidence.”291 
These proposals have promise and may be justified in other
contexts, but repose is needed for securities fraud litigation.
Congress has already expressed its desire that liability for securi-
287. See supra Part III.B.2.
288. See supra Part III.B.3.
289. See Green, supra note 233 (proposing abolishing the statute of limitations in toxic tort
litigation); Malveaux, supra note 202 (proposing abolishing the statute of limitations in
reparations litigation); Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law,
29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1015 (1997) (arguing that all statutes of limitations should be abolished).
290. Wistrich, supra note 235, at 643.
291. Ehud Guttel & Michael T. Novick, A New Approach to Old Cases: Reconsidering
Statutes of Limitation, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 129, 132-33 (2004); see also Justin Hughes, Fair
Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003) (arguing that courts should adjust the scope
of copyright protection to account for the passage of time by expressly considering time as
a factor in fair use analysis); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 409 (2002) (advancing a similar proposal). 
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ties fraud ends at some point.292 Repose, although draconian in
result, is justified by the phenomenon of loss aversion and the
impact securities litigation has on other market participants.293 
First, the concept of loss aversion as explained in behavioral
economics means that persons are more motivated by the prospect
of a loss than by a gain.294 “The subjective utility of losing a good
exceeds that of gaining it.”295 Thus, “we would have to reward
plaintiffs for filing on time by doubling or tripling the value of their
claims merely to achieve the same effect that we presently achieve
by extinguishing the value of their claims.”296 In securities litiga-
tion, where damages are already bemoaned as excessive,297 tripling
the value of the plaintiffs’ claim would impose exorbitant costs.
Furthermore, when Congress enacted the PSLRA, it specifically
removed securities fraud as a RICO predicate and thus eliminated
securities fraud plaintiffs’ ability to recover triple their damages.298
Accepting the premises that people are loss averse and that
Congress has already eschewed a regulatory scheme that triples
plaintiffs’ reward for bringing a securities fraud claim, barring
securities fraud actions after a set time will both incentivize prompt
filing and remain consistent with Congress’s intent. 
Second, repose protects settled economic expectations of not just
the defendant, but a multitude of economic actors.299 Repose pro-
tects nonculpable market players such as investors, employees, and
292. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m, 78i(e), 78r(c), 78cc(b) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
293. See Wistrich, supra note 235, at 619-20. 
294. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 235, at 33; Nava Ashraf et al., Adam Smith,
Behavioral Economist, in EXOTIC PREFERENCES: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HUMAN
MOTIVATION 87, 90-91 (2007); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless
Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 143, 150 (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2008). 
295. Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury:
Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
259, 261 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).
296. Wistrich, supra note 235, at 620. 
297. E.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of United States of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 29-37, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010) (No. 08-
905), 2009 WL 2564718; see also Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33
J. CORP. L. 223, 240 (2007). 
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 19 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 698-99. 
299. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 464-66.
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lenders, to name a few. Professor Ochoa and Judge Wistrich cap-
ture the essence of this argument: 
[S]uppose a corporation markets a drug that is discovered
twenty years later to have caused harmful, long-term side
effects. Suppose further that the corporation would be bank-
rupted by the resulting liability. There is no denying the
legitimacy of the victim’s claims for compensation. On the other
hand, during those twenty years, thousands of people may have
invested in the corporation, hundreds of people may have
accepted jobs with it, dozens of lenders may have extended
credit to it, and scores of firms may have entered business
partnerships with it. As a result of the corporation’s liability,
those investments may be forfeited, those jobs may be lost, those
loans may not be repaid, and those business partnerships may
collapse. While there may be justice in the destruction of the
corporate defendant, as time passes, the investors, employees,
lenders, and business partners acquire reliance interests that
may be disrupted by, and that must be weighed against, the
victims’ claims to compensation.300
This concern is more apparent in securities fraud where scholars
suggest that the costs of securities class actions—both the settle-
ment and the litigation expenses of both sides—fall largely on the
defendant corporation, and so its shareholders ultimately bear
these costs indirectly.301 This “circularity” problem, though, occurs
only at the margins—most of the class recovery does not come from
the class members themselves.302
300. Id. at 467-68; see also Holmes, supra note 1, at 477 (“[T]he foundation of the
acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the person who
gains them, not in that of the loser.”); Malveaux, supra note 202, at 76 (recognizing that
companies benefit greatly from the knowledge that they are immune from suit and can
engage in commercial transactions unencumbered by the risk of litigation). 
301. Coffee, supra note 205, at 1536; James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 509-11 (1997). Judge Jed Rakoff recently rejected Bank of
America’s settlement with the SEC, observing that “[i]t is not fair, first and foremost,
because it does not comport with the most elementary notions of justice and morality, in that
it proposes that the shareholders who were the victims of the Bank’s alleged misconduct now
pay the penalty for that misconduct.” SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
302. Cox, supra note 301, at 509. Professor James Cox has explained,
The question of entity liability is not ... limited to securities law violations and
there seems little reason to so isolate the debate of the propriety of entity
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B. Event-Accrual and the Five-Year Statute of Repose
Assuming that repose is necessary, but a statute of limitations
that is triggered upon discovery should be abolished, what should
the limitations period for securities fraud look like? Part IV.B
proposes a five-year limitations period that accrues upon the
happening of the fraud. 
To begin, we acknowledge that any cut-off date will be arbi-
trary,303 but also note that Congress has already expressed a value
judgment that repose for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is appropri-
ate after either two years or five years.304 So we accept these periods
as a starting point. Further, there are already settled expectations
that, at the latest, no liability attaches after five years in Congress’s
plan. This is important because adherence to the five-year period
does not increase the risk that defendants will take strategic
advantage of this absolute bar to liability. Thus, Congress should
retain only the longer five-year statute of repose that is triggered
upon the happening of the fraud (event-accrual). 
The five-year period is also preferable to the two-year period as
it provides plaintiffs the necessary time to discover the claim and
liability to securities violations. Managerial misbehavior ... is a portion of the
risk that accompanies ownership. It is a risk internalized through the concept
of entity liability.
The financial burdens of a securities fraud settlement borne by the innocent
stockholders of the corporate violator is indistinguishable from the burden
borne by the shareholders of the corporation that produces a defective product
or violates the environmental laws. Being a burden of ownership, it is inherent
in the feature of enterprise liability that the enterprise internalize the costs of
its activities.
Id. at 511. 
303. E.g., Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975) (“Although any
statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of the period allowed for instituting
suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor
of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of
stale ones.”); Tioga R.R. v. Blossburg & Corning R.R., 87 U.S. 137, 150 (1873) (Hunt, J.,
concurring) (“Statutes of limitation are in their nature arbitrary. They rest upon no other
foundation than the judgment of a State as to what will promote the interests of its citizens.
Each determines such limits and imposes such restraints as it thinks proper.”); Lantz v.
Comm’r, 607 F.3d 479, 482 (7th Cir. 2010) (“They borrow an existing statute of limitations
rather than create one because ‘the length of a limitations period is arbitrary—you can’t
reason your way to it—and courts are supposed not to be arbitrary; when they are, they get
criticized for it.’”) (quoting Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1987)).
304. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006).
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develop the complaint.305 Resolving securities fraud claims on their
merits, as opposed to procedural grounds, is consistent with the
purpose of the judiciary to resolve disputes based on substantive
law. It comports with notions of fairness and due process, and pre-
serves the dignitary value of the judiciary by affording an aggrieved
person a right to be heard.306 Additionally, a longer period of lia-
bility furthers the enforcement of the securities laws, which in
particular depends on private attorneys general for holistic enforce-
ment.307 As Professor Ochoa and Judge Wistrich observe, the loss of
a valid claim because of the statute of limitations results in under-
enforcement of the substantive law.308 Adopting a longer limitations
305. See supra Part III.B.2; see also Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale
for the Existence of Statutes of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 115 (2002)
(“The ‘continuing conspiracy’ doctrine ... offers an example of a case where the statute of
limitations should be extended (‘tolled’). When overt (but otherwise legal) acts associated
with an earlier conspiracy are committed, they cause harm in addition to the harm caused
by the original conspiracy. As a result, they should be deterred. Extending the statute of
limitations for the original conspiracy is one way of deterring these later harmful actions,
even if the extended statute of limitations adds little to deterrence of the original crime.”);
Thomas J. Miceli, Deterrence, Litigation Costs, and the Statute of Limitations for Tort Suits,
20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 383, 393 (2000) (“[T]he optimal statute length appears to be longer
under a negligence rule as compared to a strict liability rule. The reason is that, when the
statute is lengthened, it increases incentives for care (deterrence), thereby making it harder
for plaintiffs to prove negligence at trial. Thus, fewer cases are filed at any point in time,
which lowers expected litigation costs. Since this benefit partially offsets the extra litigation
costs incurred by lengthening the statute, the optimal statute is longer.”). 
306. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 501-03. Professor Owen Fiss, making an
argument against settlement, observes that
adjudication uses public resources, and employs ... public officials chosen by a
process in which the public participates. These officials, like members of the
legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been defined and
conferred by public law, not by private agreement. Their job is not to maximize
the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution
and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle.
Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). This sentiment
is equally applicable to resolving cases based on procedural grounds, like the statute of
limitations. 
307. In congressional testimony, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated, “Private
actions are crucial to the integrity of our disclosure system because they provide a direct
incentive for issuers and other market participants to meet their obligations under the
securities laws.” S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 38 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 716. 
308. Professor Ochoa and Judge Wistrich state, 
[T]he loss of a valid claim on the ground of limitation of actions (or on any other
procedural ground) impairs the implementation of substantive law policy. It
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period is more consistent with promoting the resolution of these
claims on their merits. 
Next, event-accrual is preferable to discovery-accrual for several
reasons. Under discovery-based accrual, courts conclude that the
defendants have committed an actionable wrong, but deny any
remedy. As the majority in the Third Circuit’s Merck decision
remarked about the dissent’s conclusion that there were actionable
misrepresentations that precluded litigation, “It is ironic that the
dissent, although noting what might be viewed as Merck’s misrep-
resentations, would apply the statute of limitations to deprive
plaintiffs of the opportunity to prove a viable case against Merck for
such misrepresentations.”309 This result is absurd; the logic is
tortured. Event-accrual avoids this nonsensical conclusion. 
Moreover, event-accrual achieves all the laudable aims that a
statute of limitations with discovery-accrual misses. Event-accrual
provides a bright-line rule that is simple in application, which has
many benefits.310 A bright-line rule removes the uncertainty that
plagues Merck’s “discovery” standard.311 Once the time set forth in
a statute of repose is up, plaintiffs can be certain that their claims
results in the underenforcement of the substantive law by allowing some
wrongdoers to escape liability for reasons unrelated to the objectives of the
substantive law. Not only will some wrongdoers fail to receive their “just
deserts,” but they will also be underdeterred from future wrongdoing because
they were not required to compensate their victims for the harm caused and to
suffer the punishment of civil liability. Others who are instructed by their
examples will also be less than optimally deterred from violating the
substantive law rules. As a consequence, the substantive law rules will be
followed less often than they would have been had the victims’ claims not been
barred by the limitation system.
Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 506.
309. In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 543 F.3d 150, 172 n.16 (3d Cir.
2008). 
310. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown L.L.P., 603 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A
bright line rule ... has many benefits in application. [It] is relatively easy for district courts
to apply and avoids protracted litigation and discovery .... Furthermore, as the Supreme
Court has explained, securities law is an area that demands certainty and predictability.
Uncertainty can lead to many undesirable consequences, for example, newer and smaller
companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals. A professional may fear
that a newer or smaller company may not survive and that business failure would generate
securities litigation against the professional, among others. Uncertainty also increases the
costs of doing business and raising capital.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). 
311. See supra Part III.B.3.
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are time-barred. In turn, sanctions become more effective because
plaintiffs will have lost any colorable argument that a claim past
the statute of repose was made in good faith.312 Thus, event-accrual
will greatly influence plaintiffs’ decisions to timely file. In any
event, if claims are filed that lie outside the statute of repose, they
can be easily dispensed with by the judiciary at the preliminary
stage, thus saving the courts and the parties costs of later liti-
gation.313 
One final note, a longer limitations period stems the erosion of
the private 10b-5 right of action through procedural rules. If secu-
rities fraud litigation is disfavored, the substantive law should be
changed to restrict its availability or eliminate the private 10b-5
right of action altogether rather than hamper plaintiff-investors
with a short, arbitrary cutoff date.314 Congress and the courts have
erected barriers in class certification, pleading, and summary judg-
ment, all the while maintaining the visage of supporting investors’
rights to recover for stock fraud.315 But these procedural barriers
are improperly used to “achieve indirectly what could not be
achieved directly.”316
CONCLUSION
Even when the discovery provision in the statute of limitations
for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims is interpreted in favor of
plaintiff-investors, as was the case in Merck, it still creates pleading
traps for the unwary, introduces a new ground to forum shop, and
is otherwise harmful to plaintiff-investors. Discovery-accrual serves
no legitimate goal that a statute of repose that accrues upon the
happening of the fraud cannot better achieve. Discovery-accrual
312. See De La Fuente v. DCI Telecomm., Inc., 82 F. App’x 723, 724-26 (2d Cir. 2003)
(nonprecedential decision affirming Rule 11 sanctions against counsel that frivolously
opposed dismissal of securities claims barred by statute of repose). 
313. See, e.g., Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. v. Brant, No. 06 Civ. 05279(LTS), 2010
WL 1257351, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010) (dismissing easily allegations that fell outside
the five-year repose period by relying solely on dates of alleged fraud); Plymouth County Ret.
Ass’n v. Schroeder, 576 F. Supp. 2d 360, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (same); In re Juniper Networks,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (same); In re Affiliated Computer
Servs. Derivative Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 695, 701 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (same).
314. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 499.
315. See generally Murdock, supra note 157, at 186. 
316. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 499.
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ignores the realities of securities litigation. Plaintiffs are already
significantly motivated to investigate and file, and penalizing them
for sitting on their hands erroneously assumes that the plaintiffs
discovered, or could have discovered, facts sufficient to survive the
onerous pleading requirements of the PSLRA in the first instance.
The discovery provision creates procedural costs borne by plaintiff-
investors, defendants, and the courts with no added benefit. Thus,
for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the discovery provision should be
abolished. Only the five-year statute of repose, which starts upon
the defendant’s commission of the fraud, should be retained. This
bright-line rule prevents the filing of time-barred claims, makes the
availability of sanctions certain, and can be readily resolved before
a jury must be empanelled. Further, in SOX, Congress saw fit to
provide a five-year measure of repose.317 This time period alone
sufficiently enables plaintiffs to file meritorious claims, but also
protects settled economic expectations. 
317. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
